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Introduction
Zeynep N. Kaya
Zeynep N. Kaya is Research Fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre. She is currently leading a 
research project examining at the role of international actors in enhancing women’s rights after mili-
tary intervention, focusing on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
On 15 December 2015, the LSE Middle East Centre organised a workshop bringing 
together key experts on Turkish domestic and foreign policy. The workshop aimed at 
explaining the relationship between Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy in the 
Middle East in the midst of a period when both Turkey and the wider region are facing 
major challenges and undergoing significant transformations. This volume brings together 
a collection of papers presented at the workshop. 
Explaining the links between states’ domestic politics and their foreign policies is no easy 
task. In tackling this, authors of these papers adopt the principal idea that foreign policy 
decisions made by governments are shaped internally by the domestic political environ-
ment and internationally by the perceptions of threats and opportunities. They suggest 
that the amount of power vested in a government and the extent to which public opinion 
in society affects its decisions influence foreign policy-making in significant ways. This view 
overlooks neither the complexity of the domestic context in Turkey, nor the multiplicity 
of governmental and non-governmental actors and social, economic, political and histor-
ical factors that shape Turkish foreign policy. However, in order to narrow the scope and 
create a coherent analysis, the papers focus on the governmental level and on the Kurdish 
issue as domestic and regional factors. 
At the domestic level, Turkey recently held two general elections, both in the same year. 
While losing its electoral majority in the June 2015 elections, the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) regained it in November. Since mid-2015, the country has been going through 
one of the most turbulent periods of its history. During this time, the conflict with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) resumed, the country experienced the biggest terrorist 
attacks on civilians since its establishment, and political polarisation further deepened. 
Moreover, politics became more securitised and the definition of terrorism expanded to 
include an increasingly wide range of activities. The government became particularly sen-
sitive and reactive towards any criticism of its policies, which led to an increased number of 
prosecutions. These trends continue to affect the country in 2016. 
At the regional level, the AKP government has been following a policy of greater and 
deeper engagement with the Middle East. The increased power and authority of the AKP 
for more than a decade increased its ability to generate foreign policies that largely disre-
gard the historical Turkish position of ‘minimal engagement with the Middle East’. The 
government’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy did not lead to expected outcomes. 
In this process, especially in recent years, the Turkish government framed its regional 
security–threat through a focus on the Kurdish issue. This perception in turn played a sig-
nificant role in shaping the AKP’s foreign policy in the region.
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The first set of papers presented here elaborate on why the AKP has been able to consol-
idate its domestic power and authority and to generate a somewhat non-resisting public 
opinion towards its domestic and regional policies. In this context, the government has 
managed to develop strategies that do not pay lip service to or take into account opposing 
views and critical interest groups, internally and externally. Güneş Murat Tezcür explains 
the historical and contemporary trends in the Turkish political system that led to the AKP’s 
rise. Menderes Çınar then traces the processes through which the AKP consolidated its 
power. Naz Masraff forecasts short and long-term future trends in Turkish domestic pol-
itics. Lastly, Evren Balta analyses Kurdish politics and conflict throughout the AKP rule. 
The rest of the papers move on to the analysis of regional factors that constitute the core 
of Turkey’s foreign policy in its immediate neighbourhood in order to explain the links 
between domestic and foreign policy of Turkey. Elizabeth Ferris analyses Turkey’s refugee 
policy historically and today. Bill Park investigates developments within Iraqi Kurdistan 
and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) perception of its relations with Turkey. 
Aydın Selcen elaborates on Turkey’s policies towards the KRG. Güney Yıldız describes the 
reasons behind Turkey’s reaction to Rojava, the de facto Kurdish autonomous region in 
Syria. Lastly, Cengiz Çandar concludes with an analysis that entangles the complex rela-
tionship between the AKP’s domestic Kurdish policies and its Middle East policies. 
This collected volume hopes to offer valuable insights for academics, experts and pol-
icy-makers interested in Turkish politics and foreign policy in the Middle East. The 
contributors’ strong analytical and empirical approach and their deep awareness of the 
impact of domestic and regional factors shaping Turkey’s Middle East policies have led to 
a systematic and rich analysis. On behalf of the LSE Middle East Centre, I would like to 
thank the Chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies at LSE, Esra Özyürek, for her help and 
support in running the workshop. I would also like to extend my thanks to Deniz Zeyrek, 
Gönül Tol and Serhat Erkmen, whose insightful presentations at the event in December 
greatly informed this collected volume. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the 
authors for their brilliant contributions and for their amazing cooperation throughout the 
process that led to this publication.
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Historical and Contemporary Trends in the Turkish 
Political Party System
Güneş Murat Tezcür
Güneş Murat Tezcür is the Jalal Talabani Chair of Kurdish Political Studies at the University of 
Central Florida.
Introduction
The period since the June 2011 parliamentary elections, which consolidated the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP)’s political hegemony, witnessed a series of events unprec-
edented in the history of contemporary Turkey. On 28 December 2011, Turkish fighter 
jets bombed a group of Kurdish smugglers crossing the border from Iraqi Kurdistan, kill-
ing 34 villagers. This was the deadliest instance of civilians killed by state forces since the 
transition to multiparty democracy in 1950. None of the state officials responsible for the 
massacre were put on trial. In late May 2013, a localised protest against the demolition of 
a small park (the Gezi Park) in the centre of Istanbul transformed into nationwide mass 
demonstrations against the AKP government resulting in a disproportionate police reac-
tion. Millions of people participated, mostly non-violently, and the Gezi protests became 
the largest anti-government demonstrations in the entire history of the Turkish Republic. 
In December 2013, anti-corruption investigations implicated prominent members of the 
government, revealing widespread levels of collusion between politicians and businessmen. 
These three episodes represented the end of the AKP’s alliances with three groups that had 
been central to its rise. The impunity in the aftermath of the Roboski massacre of 2011 dis-
illusioned large segments of Kurdish society that had been supportive of the AKP. Brutal 
treatment of Gezi protestors at the hands of the police undermined the AKP’s liberal intel-
ligentsia that had strongly supported the party during its power struggle with the military 
and high judiciary. The anti-corruption investigations of December 2013 transformed the 
Gülen movement from one of the key allies of the AKP into its nemesis. 
Despite these challenges, the AKP made significant gains in the March 2014 local elections. 
The worst industrial disaster of Turkish history (that resulted in the death of 301 mine 
workers in Western Anatolia) took place in the immediate aftermath of these elections. Yet 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan easily won the first competitive popular elections for the presidency 
a few months later. The Kobanî riots of October 2014 that claimed more than 50 lives, pri-
marily in Kurdish cities, were ominous portents of the violence that would engulf Turkey 
in the second half of 2015. In the aftermath of these events and following a weakening of 
economic performance, the AKP lost its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 elections. 
Shortly after, a suicide bomb attack targeting leftist activists visiting the border town of 
Suruç, just north of Kobanî, where Kurdish militants successfully fought back a large-scale 
Islamic State (IS) assault with the help of US airstrikes in fall 2014, killed 34 individuals. 
This IS-sponsored attack brought a definite end to the fragile ceasefire between the Turk-
ish state and the Kurdish insurgency that had been in effect since early 2013. Violence 
rapidly reached levels unprecedented since 1999, and the rekindling of armed conflict 
8 The AKP and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
resulted in the deaths of at least 600 individuals in five months. Meanwhile, in the face of 
major intelligence failures on part of the government, another IS sponsored suicide attack 
killed 102 individuals in a peace rally attended by leftist and Kurdish activists in a central 
square in Ankara on 10 October. 
Given this background, the AKP’s overwhelming performance in the November elections 
that enabled the party to recapture a parliamentary majority took many observers by sur-
prise. The election results have revealed that many voters in Turkey do not hold the party 
and its leader Erdoğan accountable for these troubles. Ironically, as Erdoğan increasingly 
personifies political power and erodes the autonomy of economic and political institutions, 
he also appears as the only politician capable of ensuring stability and growth in the coun-
try. While his ascendancy represents the historical evolution of the Turkish right and its 
mission to integrate pious Muslims into the political system, it also has negative implica-
tions for democratic struggles.
A Rightist Advantage 
The initial impetus for democratisation in Turkey took place in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II. The Soviet threat made the Western alliance led by the US essential for Tur-
key’s security. In this geopolitical context, the introduction of a parliamentary regime was 
facilitated by rivalries among the Turkish political elite whose ideological differences did 
not lessen their shared commitment to the Republican ideal of Westernisation. The Dem-
ocrat Party (DP), formed by a group of politicians who had defected from the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) that founded the Republic, formed the first popularly elected gov-
ernment in 1950 and ruled the country until its overthrow by a military coup in 1960. The 
DP’s brand of populism glorified the ‘common man’ and aimed to correct the ‘excesses’ of 
the CHP one-party rule (1922–1950), most importantly with various restrictions on public 
preaching and expressions of Sunni Islam. 
The parties who claimed the mantle of the DP have won most of the elections in Turkey in 
the subsequent decades, with the exception of the 1970s. In fact, rightist parties of various 
sorts have ruled Turkey for most of the time since the introduction of electoral democracy. 
In contrast, leftist parties have never managed to capture the parliamentary majorities nec-
essary for a single-party government. The DP’s successor, Süleyman Demirel’s Justice Party 
(AP), won the 1965 and 1969 elections. It was weakened but continued to form coalition 
governments as the senior partner in the 1970s. The 1980s saw the rise of Turgut Özal’s 
Motherland Party (ANAP) that remained in power between 1983 and 1991. The period 
from 1991 to 2002 is known as the era of coalition governments. While no centre-right 
party managed to achieve electoral hegemony during this period, both the ANAP and AP’s 
successor the Right Path Party (DYP) continued to be in government. The AKP’s victory in 
the 2002 elections resulted in a return to single-party rule reminiscent of the DP, AP, and 
ANAP’s years of glory. While the AKP was founded primarily by politicians who spent their 
formative years in Islamist political circles, it also positioned itself as the party continuing 
the legacy of the DP. 
The conventional political sociology approach is to seek the causes of this rightist advan-
tage in Turkish politics in historical configurations of state-society relations that pit an elite 
with a narrow social base and a modernist agenda against large masses resenting certain 
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aspects of this agenda. While this simplified binary distinction fails to shed light on com-
plexities of democratisation in Turkey, its focus on one of the main cleavages of Turkey 
remains insightful. As long as rightist political forces unify around a single party and avoid 
fragmentation, they are not prone to electoral defeats. As the mainstream Turkish left is 
associated with this modernist agenda, it has had no electoral success in reaching large 
segments of society harbouring conservative values and remaining highly pious. The AKP 
appears as both the latest and most successful formation of this rightist dominance.
The electoral dominance of rightist political parties has contradictory implications for 
Turkish democracy that has historically been beset by first, categorical inequalities under-
mining equal access and representation in the political system and, second, powerful, 
extra-parliamentary forces constraining the rule of elected politicians. Regarding the 
former, the Turkish state has had ethnic, sectarian, and secularist biases hampering – to 
various degrees – the political representation of a large number of citizens. Regarding 
the latter, the political autonomy of the Turkish military has been a constant threat to the 
stability of parliamentarism and the integrity of human rights. A third and more recent 
challenge has been the rise of clandestine trust networks with undue influence over polit-
ical affairs. An example of these networks is the Gülen movement, whose globalised civil 
society activism is overshadowed by schemes and conspiracies pursued by its members in 
key organs of the state bureaucracy, such as the judiciary and police. 
From Victimhood to Triumphalism 
Like the centre-right parties of the preceding decades, such as Adnan Menderes’ DP of 
the 1950s, Süleyman Demirel’s AP of the 1960s, and Turgut Özal’s ANAP of the 1980s, the 
AKP have pursued two objectives conducive to Turkish democratisation. However, unlike 
them, it has achieved remarkable success in its pursuits. First, the AKP has mostly revoked 
the secularist regulations that hindered the public participation of pious Muslims just a 
decade after the 1997 military intervention that sought to root out Islamist influence in 
politics. The AKP strategically made the sense of victimhood shared by pious Muslims 
central to its mission and gained their unwavering loyalty by enabling their greater repre-
sentation in all echelons of state and society. Erdoğan’s experience of brief imprisonment 
undoubtedly bestowed more authenticity on his party’s claim to represent pious Muslims 
who had been the pariahs of the Republic. The AKP also tamed the power of the military, a 
force that presented an existential threat to political pluralism with its history of repeated 
interventions and extrajudicial practices. In its struggle with the military, the AKP had the 
significant support of the Gülen network, liberal intelligentsia, and Kurdish public opinion 
as well as key foreign actors such as the European Union (EU). 
Turkish democracy’s failings continue to persist in defying the optimistic view that the 
consolidation of AKP power would lead to an unequivocal and linear democratic progress. 
In fact, the sense of ‘Sunni Muslim victimhood’ that had been the internal driving force 
of the AKP’s reformist impulses has now turned into a triumphalist stance that aggra-
vates sectarian and ethnic biases of political power in Turkey. Furthermore, geopolitical 
developments since the 2008 economic crisis have had detrimental effects for democratic 
struggles in Turkey. Before 2008, EU membership was central to Turkish foreign policy 
and constrained the authoritarian tendencies of the government. As the EU gradually lost 
its relevance for Turkish elites and public, the AKP saw in the Arab uprisings of 2011 an 
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unprecedented opportunity to seek regional power. The expectation among AKP elites 
was that the uprisings would bring popular Islamist forces to power with similar ideologies 
to the AKP. This expectation turned into a bitter disillusionment, especially after the fall 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the descent of the Syrian uprising into a vicious 
civil war. 
A Sectarian Turn 
In this regional context where political affiliations tend to overlap with sectarian differ-
ences, the AKP has adopted an increasingly sectarian discourse. This is an important 
difference that sets the AKP apart from previous centre-right parties with less blatant pro-
Sunni biases. Erdoğan explicitly highlighted the Alevi identity of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the 
CHP leader, during the 2011 electoral campaign in an attempt to discredit him in the eyes 
of pious Sunni voters. Meanwhile, the AKP and the intelligentsia developed a sectarian 
framing of the Syrian civil war where a repressive minority Alawite regime (their historical 
and cultural differences with Alevis in Turkey were overlooked) were brutally massacring 
the majority Sunni population. As the intensity of violence increased, Islamist groups were 
co-opted by the AKP and gained unprecedented public visibility and access to resources. 
They became the enthusiastic supporters of the armed struggle against the Assad regime. 
In the absence of any serious government effort to prevent them, a large number of Turk-
ish citizens joined the jihadist groups in Syria. 
This policy had an unexpected and dire consequence: the rise of IS with its ideology of 
takfiri Salafi jihadism in 2013. Salafi–jihadist groups in Turkey found a fertile ground 
for recruitment in the absence of government surveillance. These groups were also the 
only Islamists that kept their distance from the AKP government and offered a puritanical 
version of Islam attractive to individuals disenchanted with the lack of a true Islamic gov-
ernment in Turkey. The rising appeal of this extreme form of Islamism at a time when an 
Islamist party was in power contradicts scholarly expectations that moderation naturally 
comes at the expense of radicalism. 
In the summer of 2013, the Egyptian army overthrew Mohammad Morsi, an Islamist and 
the first person to be elected to the presidency in free and fair elections in Egypt. Adopting 
a discourse of victimhood, Erdoğan and his supporters framed the Gezi protests as a ‘coup 
attempt’ that coincided with events in Egypt. Erdoğan charged Gezi protestors with lacking 
basic respect for Islam and made unfounded allegations against them (such as drinking 
beer in a mosque or attacking a veiled woman) in order to mobilise his base. 
While the AKP has become more sectarian than the centre-right parties of the previous 
decades, it has also been more liberal regarding the role of ethnic identity in Turkish pol-
itics. Its Kurdish reforms have been inspired by a stance that emphasises common Muslim 
identity transcending linguistic differences, and are consistent with the its highlighting 
of Sunni Muslim identity in public affairs. Furthermore, the AKP’s direct challenge to 
the political power of the military contributed to its appeal among Kurdish citizens. In 
contrast, centre-parties since the DP primarily relied on Kurdish notables and patronage 
relations in order to mobilise the Kurdish vote. Nonetheless, the growing popular dyna-
mism and appeal of Kurdish nationalism has made the AKP’s strategy of cultural rights 
under the discourse of Islamic brotherhood inadequate and outdated. Kurdish self-rule 
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in Syria emboldened the military wing of the Kurdish nationalist movement that aimed 
to replicate the success in Turkey’s Kurdish cities through armed struggle. After the June 
2015 elections, Kurdish support for the AKP appeared dispensable. Police and military 
sweeps against PKK militants in highly congested urban areas resulted in widespread 
human rights violations and heavy civilian casualties and signified a return to the securi-
ty-first policies of the early 1990s. Kurdish nationalism, which eluded both the ANAP and 
DYP, continues to be the biggest challenge to the AKP, as the party seems to lack strategies 
and policies for its management. 
The Fragility of Authoritarianism in Turkey
The AKP’s evolution from a reformist rightist party into a majoritarian force benefiting 
from and aggravating Turkey’s social cleavages in a time of escalating geopolitical tensions 
leaves Turkish democracy in a bleak state. In the wake of its power struggle with the Gülen 
movement, the AKP reached a rapprochement with the military. This realignment also 
ended the government’s willingness to support prosecutions where security officers were 
accused of human rights violations in the 1990s and put on trial. Opposition parties lack 
strategies to challenge the AKP’s electoral dominance given the political sociology of Turk-
ish electorate. The CHP, the main opposition party under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu, 
received the support of a quarter of the voters, but remains feeble vis-à-vis the AKP. The 
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), whose unexpectedly solid performance in the June 2015 
elections generated a moment of euphoria, fails to overcome the idea of armed struggle 
bolstered by the Rojava experience and to engage in the non-violent coalition building that 
is essential for cross-ethnic mobilisation. The Gezi protests briefly presented an unprece-
dented challenge to Erdoğan’s authoritarianism, but also deepened social divisions before 
dying down. The EU accession process that was the chief external impetus for democra-
tisation during the initial AKP years now appears irrelevant to the Turkish political body. 
While the refugee crisis and the rise of IS contributes to Turkey’s geopolitical importance, 
they also undermine the EU’s willingness and ability to prevent rights violations. 
Nevertheless, there is a silver lining. While President Erdoğan has established his personal 
dominance over Turkish politics and eroded the autonomy of its institutions present, his 
rule lacks a strong institutional basis. Turkey has a history of political pluralism that is 65 
years longer than many contemporary democracies. The AKP lacks a strong party identity 
and is highly dependent on Erdoğan’s direct interventions to preserve its coherence. A new 
constitutional order is unlikely to give rise to new institutions under complete control of 
the President, as the AKP still needs the cooperation of other parties. Consequently, the 
ephemerality of personalistic rule, the irreducibly pluralistic nature of Turkish politics, and 
the vulnerability of the Turkish economy may result in a more fragmented and competitive 
electoral arena, which may in turn herald a new era of democratic reform. 
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The Power Strategies of the AKP in Turkey
Menderes Çınar
Menderes Çınar is Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, 
Başkent University, Ankara.
Introduction
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been Turkey’s predominant party from the 
first elections they contested in 2002. The AKP steadily increased its share of votes from 
35 percent in 2002 to 47 percent in 2007 and 49 percent in 2011, enjoying very comfort-
able majorities and forming single-party governments. This trend faced a setback in the 
7 June 2015 elections, when the AKP failed to gain enough seats to form a single party 
government, despite winning 40 percent of the votes and surpassing its closest rival by a 
15 percent margin. Following this, the AKP’s de facto leader, President Erdoğan, used his 
constitutional powers and political leverage over the party to prevent the formation of a 
coalition government and to return to the electorate in repeat elections, held on 1 Novem-
ber 2015. In these elections the AKP increased their votes by 9 percent and restored their 
predominant position. 
This paper gives an account of the AKP’s durability in power in two periods, up to the final 
defeat of Turkey’s military-led secular establishment in 2010. During the first period, the 
AKP proved to be a durable political force by accomplishing defensive and redistributive 
objectives, both of which entailed some reformist policies to contain and dismantle the 
power of the secular establishment and to carve out spaces for Turkey’s Islamic/conser-
vative identity within the nation’s political fabric. In the second period, the AKP were 
preoccupied with prolonging their power position and expanding the domains of their 
control by exploiting and deepening the divisions in Turkey’s torn society and increasing 
the cost of opposition. 
Phase 1: Dismantling the Kemalist Establishment
During the first period, the AKP maintained a broad-based appeal by becoming a political 
patron protecting Islamic identity from a very real threat of secularist aggression and provid-
ing for the hitherto marginalised Islamic bourgeoisie and urban poor. These required some 
Europeanising, civilianising and neo-liberalising reforms designed to dismantle the Kemal-
ist status quo which, by that time, did not really serve beyond the waning secular sectors of 
society. The dismantling of the Kemalist establishment also came to epitomise democratisa-
tion and masked the AKP’s paternalist outlook and self-interested search for power. 
The founders and the core constituency of the AKP were willing to embrace the neo-liberal 
paradigm which, as in the case of Latin American neo-populism, would give them oppor-
tunities to build up their own economic power base. A massive privatisation drive, a major 
social security reform and a series of tailored legal changes enabled the AKP to integrate 
the marginalised informal sectors and the conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie. The AKP 
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also addressed negative side effects of its neoliberal programme by mobilising the state 
apparatus as well as the friendly Islamic NGOs and foundations to distribute some in-kind 
benefits such as coal and food to the needy. The beneficiaries of this type of social help 
have no legal entitlement to the assistance they receive and this renders them susceptible 
to partisan pressures and political blackmailing.
The most critical element facilitating the AKP’s paternalist outlook was a defensive mission, 
to which they were compelled by the secular opposition. The secular opposition took the 
futile dichotomy between Islam and secularism for granted and reproduced the militarist 
mentality of the 28 February process, which back in the latter part of the 1990s defined 
Islamic identity as an internal enemy and aimed at eradicating it so as to restore the polit-
ical centre along Kemalist lines. This resulted in an opposition reduced to secularism, and 
a secularism reduced to the dismissal and intimidation of the AKP and its conservative 
constituency. Hence, the association of secularism with authoritarianism and the AKP’s 
defensive mission.
The militarist nature of the secular opposition facilitated the development of a vicious cycle 
of power politics, in which the AKP could guarantee the support and loyalty of the con-
servative identity simply by empowering themselves vis-à-vis the Kemalist establishment 
to prevent a secularist aggression. This rendered the AKP less susceptible to the demands 
of the rank-and-file and the conservative constituency, and facilitated the development 
of an extremely hierarchical party organisation with an explicit paternalist attitude. In 
fact, Erdoğan could dismiss and postpone demands, and avoid making promises on the 
grounds of the exigencies of the struggle against the Kemalist establishment. 
This cycle of power politics has also enabled the AKP to anoint themselves the champions 
of democracy and democratisation with a vaguely defined ‘conservative democrat’ identity 
and without putting forward a comprehensive democratisation agenda. This is because 
neither the extra-political power of the Kemalist establishment nor its categorisation of the 
AKP as illegitimate was in congruence with democratic politics. In a sense, by compelling 
the AKP to a power struggle for its own survival, the secular opposition has made it possible 
for the AKP to equate its self-interested search for power with democratisation. 
Phase 2: Prolonging the AKP’s Power
During the second phase, after the AKP’s victory against the Kemalist establishment, the 
future of Turkish democracy was left to the mercy of the AKP. This is because, tradition-
ally, it was the Kemalist establishment that surrogated the liberal mechanisms for a limited 
government by checking and balancing the civilian politicians from an extra-political posi-
tion to keep them within the parameters they set for legitimate political activity. Also, the 
secular opposition that relied on the establishment now had to go through a long process 
of change before becoming a viable contender to the AKP. Finally, the European Union 
(EU), by failing to produce a political will for Turkey’s full membership back in 2004, lost 
its political leverage over the AKP and rendered itself redundant as far as Turkey’s democ-
ratisation was concerned. 
By prevailing over the Kemalist establishment, the AKP were no longer able to portray 
their self-interested search for power as democratisation. This rendered the AKP more 
open to political criticism for its various failures and shortcomings from within and outside. 
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Thereby their mass support has become more fragile. To overcome this fragility, the AKP 
wanted the people to entrust Turkey’s democratisation to them, but not to evaluate their 
political performance in light of the norms of democracy. The AKP, in effect, elevated them-
selves above democratic politics/criticism, monopolised democracy and linked democratic 
stability to their own position of power, which they wanted to shore up. To prolong their 
position by gaining the popular mandate, the AKP have employed a three-tiered strategy. 
First, they emphasised their past performance in ‘democratising’ and ‘modernising’ the 
country, and used such catchphrases as ‘2023 targets’ and ‘new Turkey’ to capture the 
imagination of the people. In so doing, they emphasised economic development and infra-
structure modernisation. Consequently, grand construction projects like a third bridge 
over the Bosporus, motorway and railway tunnels under the Bosporus, a third airport in 
Istanbul, massive ‘urban transformation’ constructions in Turkey’s big cities; and hastily 
developed national automobile and plane projects came to signify the ‘new Turkey’. 
The Turkish centre-right tradition since the inception of competitive politics in 1950 has 
taken economic development and modernisation as Turkey’s national project to downplay 
the Kemalist single-party regime’s (1924–46) rather unpopular cultural modernisation 
project and to emphasise that, unlike the Kemalist elite, they are concerned with the 
well-being of people, or ‘serving the nation’. The AKP’s emphasis on economic well-being 
and improved infrastructure was in line with the centre-right tradition and certainly reso-
nated with a sizeable part of Turkish society. 
Strategies for Power Consolidation
The AKP abused its willingness and capacity to serve the nation to categorise the rest of 
the political class as populist and anti-political, painting any opposition as redundant and 
obstructive as far as the well-being of people was concerned. ‘Serving the nation’ provided 
the AKP with grounds upon which to justify its search for executive supremacy as well. 
What we needed for achieving a great economic leap forward was the capacity to make fast 
decisions without facing judicial and other hurdles. This search for executive supremacy 
has hindered the development of a rule-based institutional infrastructure as well as the 
realisation of much needed economic reforms. Henceforth, the management of the econ-
omy has become increasingly arbitrary and clientalist distribution of state contracts and 
licences amounted to serious corruption. 
The second aspect of the AKP’s power strategy aimed at obscuring its democratic failures, 
disciplining the Islamic/conservative constituency, forestalling the possibility of political 
criticism from within and outside, and rendering political criticism a categorically hostile 
endeavour. Here the AKP took Turkey’s torn society for granted and deployed all the 
mutually exclusive categories that came with it as instruments for its power strategy. This 
meant that the AKP developed a polarisation-based identity and a combative style, which 
instrumentalised Islam. Consequently, pro-Western secular sectors of society were vilified 
and downgraded with an aggressively moralistic and populist language that rejected rep-
resentative politics and its civility. A re-narration of history as the struggle of democratic 
Muslim Turkish society against the authoritarian secular elite helped the AKP to claim to be 
intrinsically democratic, and associate democratisation with the restoration of an allegedly 
original and forcefully submerged (Muslim) identity of the country. Portrayed as the AKP’s 
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‘civilisational outlook’, this somewhat Islamist restoration was to correct the errors of over 
a hundred years of Westernisation in Turkey. Consequently, the AKP’s second strategy 
amounted to dividing society into ‘nationals/natives’ and ‘non-nationals/non-natives’, and 
disqualifying the latter as a Eurocentric or Islamophobic group, open to collaboration with 
evil forces simply for the purpose of damaging the AKP’s power position. Such a political 
practice has not only deepened the divisions in Turkey’s torn society, but also showed that 
democratisation in the sense of constructing a pluralist society of equal individuals is not 
the norm of the AKP. 
Thirdly, the AKP have embarked on a project of redesigning Turkey’s political institutions 
in accordance with its majoritarian understanding of democracy, which considers the pop-
ular mandate as a licence to rule in any way they deem fit. The net result of this strategy has 
been the concentration of power in the hands of the AKP and simultaneously an increase in 
the cost of opposition and criticism. On many occasions the AKP leaders made it clear that 
they find a popularly elected government sufficient for a regime to qualify as democratic 
in itself and that serving the ‘national interest’ was the norm for all branches of govern-
ment, including the judiciary. Such an understanding of democracy enabled the AKP to 
defend the notorious 10 percent electoral threshold, search for executive supremacy at the 
expense of the division of powers, restrict freedoms, delegitimise the opposition, and still 
claim to be a democratic and democratising force.
In the course of the last few years, the AKP has significantly reduced the levels of horizontal 
accountability, especially by targeting judicial independence. Perhaps more importantly, 
the AKP has undermined the very vertical accountability on which it puts an exclusive 
emphasis on the claim of democratic legitimacy. This is because, by showing intolerance 
to public criticism, by harassing the critics, by restricting freedoms of expression, assem-
bly and press, by imposing media blackouts, by channelling state funds to loyalist media 
outlets/businesses, and by subjecting non-loyalist media outlets and businesses to fiscal 
investigations, tax-fines and administrative fines, the AKP has blocked people’s access to 
alternative sources of opinion, information, and meaningful public debate. This meant 
that AKP wanted people to evaluate their government performance solely in the light of 
the information they do not block, which in effect damages the democratic quality of the 
decisions people make in the ballot-box. 
In conclusion, it can safely be suggested that what the AKP achieved in the course of the 
last few years was to render the transfer of power difficult–if not impossible. That they 
have used their power to compel the electorate to correct the ‘mistake’ they made in June 
2015 is the latest testament to their willingness to continue to monopolise democracy and 
stability in Turkey. 
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The Justice and Development Party (AKP) performed well beyond expectations and secured 
a landslide victory in the 1 November parliamentary elections. The election outcome will 
lead to a strong government, which will also deliver continuity in policy-making. In that 
sense, we are entering a more predictable phase of policy-making following the intense 
political uncertainty of last summer. 
In the long term, however, the November elections will ultimately fail to bring political 
stability to Turkish politics. The election result boosted the AKP, which regards this win 
as an affirmation of its domestic and foreign policy. Politics will, as a result, continue to 
be turbulent, which will negatively impact on the economy as well as the country’s invest-
ment climate. 
On the political front there are three key risks, the main one being the centralisation of 
executive powers around one individual, namely President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As of 1 
November, Turkey had already moved into a de facto presidential system, where Erdoğan 
was informally concentrating powers around him and his office. There is now a serious pos-
sibility that the AKP, with the help of 14 additional deputies, will change the constitution 
and formally introduce an executive presidency. 
Discussions surrounding the presidential system and attempts to realise it over the next 
year or two are likely to be divisive, creating tensions between Erdoğan and Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, between the AKP and the opposition parties, among the Turkish public 
as a whole, and even inside the AKP. There is a risk that the actual system itself, if and when 
it materialises, will hand over significant executive powers to one individual without the 
necessary checks and balances. 
The second risk is that the ruling party will now use the 1 November elections as a strong 
public endorsement of ongoing policies and will use this to continue to fight domestic 
opponents. It is therefore likely that we will witness further attacks on critical media out-
lets, journalists, businesses, as well as on bureaucrats. The rule of law will continue to be 
obstructed and the general business environment will to suffer.
Thirdly, Turkish society is more polarised than ever following the elections. Erdoğan’s 
ongoing interference in domestic politics and foreign policy, as well as ongoing clashes in 
the southeast, will only reinforce this trend. While there is no imminent sign of political 
unrest, the environment is such that large scale protests could be triggered, particularly in 
relation to the Kurdish question. Deepening societal divisions will also lead to a significant 
brain drain, which would undermine the country’s economic potential. 
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With Erdoğan continuing to dominate the cabinet and the party’s parliamentary group, a 
formal split within the party is unlikely any time soon – particularly after such a decisive 
electoral win. That said, Davutoğlu will also feel emboldened by the elections and this 
will encourage him to take a more assertive stance against Erdoğan. As a result, a power 
struggle between the President and the Prime Minister is likely. But despite Davutoğlu’s 
attempts, Erdoğan will have the upper hand in the relationship. This power struggle will 
have a negative, albeit limited, impact on policy coherence over the next year. In the lon-
ger-run, this may create fault lines within the AKP.
On the economic front, another AKP government will, to some extent, reassure investors 
as it signals continuity, but it will also reinforce incumbency problems, including strong 
rent-seeking behaviour. More importantly, the government will remain in electioneering 
mode, which will preclude attempts at economic and political reform. Given that Erdoğan’s 
game plan is to introduce a de iure presidential system through constitutional change, 
a potential referendum may be on the horizon. The government’s economic policy will, 
therefore, remain populist in nature, and reforms that address the structural problems of 
the Turkish economy will once again be stalled. 
Economically populist policies are likely to dominate the government’s agenda, particu-
larly as the country enters a period of lower growth (at about 3 percent of GDP annually). 
We will therefore observe a not-so-tight monetary policy coupled with a looser fiscal policy 
and the easing of macro prudential measures. The government will pursue immediate 
measures to support GDP growth. 
Monetary policy will also continue to be politicised. The executive will put pressure on the 
central bank (CB) to ease monetary policy given the value of the lira seems to have stabi-
lised for now. Although this pressure may not be as explicit as we have witnessed in the run 
up to parliamentary elections, the result will be the same: a more dovish Turkish central 
bank compared to its emerging markets peers. 
Under these political pressures, the CB will continue to prioritise growth over inflation. 
The appointment of the bank’s governor in April will be an important moment. With 
former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan excluded from the cabinet, current governor 
Erdem Başçı is likely to be replaced when his term is over. With this alteration, the risk of 
politicisation will be even higher. 
We also expect easing of the macro prudential policy framework introduced back in 2012 
to constrain credit growth, particularly on the consumer side. Since loan growth rates have 
plummeted sharply to 8.4 percent at the end of March (FX adjusted, excluding loans to 
financial sector), way below the CB’s target of 15 percent, the banking watchdog, the Bank-
ing Regulation and Supervision Agency, is likely to ease the macro prudential framework. 
This revision will support private domestic consumption, which will continue to constitute 
about 70 percent of Turkey’s total GDP growth, as opposed to the country’s exports or 
investments. Other than the consumer driven sectors, this move will also help the banking 
sector’s profits. 
Fiscal policy will also become looser, but we are not overly concerned given the healthy state 
of the budget. The deficit in the first two months of 2016 performed much better than the 
previous year’s. Gross debt to GDP has also been falling over the last decade and is expected 
to come down to about 32 percent by year-end. There is, therefore, a bit of room to spend. 
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In the unlikely case the AKP goes too far on the loose fiscal policy side, a red flag will be 
raised with with credit rating agencies, as Turkey risks becoming a country with twin defi-
cits. A 30 percent increase in the minimum wage as of 1 January, in line with the AKP’s 
campaign promise, has been the first move on this front, way above the average expected 
inflation rate in 2016 at about 8 percent. This move is also likely to increase the proportion 
of employment that is unregistered.
On the reform side, with a strong ruling majority, reform prospects over the next few 
years are potentially better than they would have been under a coalition or a narrow AKP 
majority. In this respect, we expect the government to conduct some changes over the next 
year or two. This will likely include an income tax reform to widen the tax base. Additional 
incentives for investments and some chances in the energy sector, as well as specific mea-
sures to constrain the current account deficit are also possible. The government will also 
support the construction and consumer-driven sectors and push forward large infrastruc-
ture projects as part of its goal to achieve near-term growth and to create employment.
That said, significant reforms to address the structural problems of Turkish economy and 
help the country achieve higher levels of growth in the medium to longer-run are likely to 
remain stalled. The previous AKP government, which also enjoyed a comfortable majority, 
did not demonstrate much appetite for reform and we have no reason to believe that this 
will now change. Moreover, the prospects of a constitutional referendum will further dis-
courage the government from adopting politically costly reforms that would hurt its own 
electorate. These key chances include productivity boosting reforms such as education and 
labour market reform, as well as more comprehensive tax and social security reforms.
The composition of the cabinet supports this populist policy outlook. Leadership within 
the economic administration is weaker due to the absence of Babacan. Despite him being 
replaced with former Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, who is also perceived to be cred-
ible by the investor community, Şimşek does not enjoy the same gravitas and standing in 
the party as Babacan. His ability to stand up to Erdoğan in times of crisis and convince 
him to follow a difficult course of economic action will be much more limited. Moreover, 
Erdoğan once again dominates the cabinet with key figures in economic administration 
perceived to be very much loyal to him. These figures will likely pursue more populist 
economic policies, in line with Erdoğan and his advisors’ priorities, further constraining 
Şimşek’s room to manoeuvre. 
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In February 2015, representatives of the AKP government and Kurdish politicians came 
together in the Dolmabahçe Palace for a meeting that Prime Minister Davutoğlu described 
as the beginning of a new phase in the peace process. After the meeting behind closed doors, 
the Turkish government and Kurdish politicians announced to the public a ten-point peace 
plan drafted by Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).1 
However, just months after this historic meeting, in June 2015, clashes between Turkish 
forces and the PKK were renewed, causing the peace process to collapse. Hundreds of 
people, including civilians, have died as a result of these clashes since then. Curfews lasting 
several days and cutting off access to the outside world were declared in many provinces 
in Southeastern Turkey.2 The Kurdish issue has once again become completely securitised 
and framed not as a problem of democracy and democratisation, but as one of terror and 
separatism. How can we explain this swing of the pendulum occurring over such a brief 
period of time, shifting between peace and war, negotiation and repression? 
In between periods of negotiation and repression, Turkey held general elections on 7 June 
2015. In these elections, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) received 13.1 
percent of the vote. The HDP not only emerged as a legitimate, moderate interlocutor for 
the Kurdish peace process but its electoral success also prevented the AKP from forming a 
single party government. In fact, had the HDP not been able to overcome the ten percent 
threshold which in the Turkish election system keeps smaller parties out of government, 
the AKP on its own could have received enough seats in parliament so as not only to form 
a majority government, but also to change the constitution. Whereas in other contexts of 
internal conflict the emergence of moderate interlocutors is seen almost as a prerequisite 
for successful peace processes, the emergence of an autonomous and successful Kurdish 
political party, specifically the HDP, as a credible alternative to the AKP’s rule became the 
major reason for the failure of the peace talks. 
The typical right-wing populist discourse of the AKP considers society to be ultimately sep-
arated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite’. Politics is then just an expression of the general will of ‘the pure people’ against the 
established privileges of ‘the corrupt elites’. Throughout the AKP’s rule, the shift between 
negotiation and repression vis-à-vis the Kurdish demands was a reflection of this right-
1  Daniel Dombey, ‘Turkish government and Kurds in bit to revitalise talks’, The Financial Times, 28 
February 2015. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d305c18-bf67-11e4-99f8-00144feab7de.htm-
l#axzz3qocjf228 (accessed 24 October 2015).
2  ‘Fact Sheet on Declared Curfews’, TIHV (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey), 26 December 2015. 
Available at http://en.tihv.org.tr/fact-sheet-on-declared-curfews-between-11-25-december-and-viola-
tions-of-right-to-life-against-civilians/ (accessed 30 December 2015).
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wing populist understanding of politics. The AKP elites included Kurdish demands when 
these demands were not strongly represented by other institutional actors – be it a legal 
party such as the HDP or an armed organisation such as the PKK – and when those actors 
did not challenge the primacy of the AKP’s agency in ‘solving’ the Kurdish problem. Thus, 
whenever a strong challenger emerged, AKP elites immediately backtracked, grabbing 
back power and repressing the opposition until they felt confident that they had regained 
control over the ‘problem’. 
The First Opening: A Strategy of Inclusion
After the capture of Öcalan and the PKK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in February 
2000, the intensity of the conflict in the southeast decreased. The AKP won the 2002 elec-
tions with significant support from the Turkish voters, securing 65 percent of the seats in 
parliament. The founders of the AKP and the leaders of the new Turkish government saw 
themselves as ‘victims’ of the military-security establishment of the 1990s, just like Kurds. 
Right from the beginning, it was clear to the AKP elites that their consolidation of political 
power was directly related to the strength of the military elites and that curbing the politi-
cal power of the military was directly related to the desecuritisation of the political sphere, 
most importantly the desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue.3 
Furthermore, AKP elites have a different understanding of what constitutes the Turkish 
nation when compared to the Kemalist elites of the previous era. According to the former, 
Turkishness wrongfully underlined the element of ethnicity and aggravated differences 
between Kurds and Turks. Instead, emphasis on the religious identity of the Kurds was 
believed to have a unifying effect on the people that had been alienated from each other 
by ethnic and secular versions of the nation. By utilising this discourse of religious unity 
and giving voice to the Kurdish constituency, AKP elites believed that they would eventu-
ally convince the already conservative ‘pure Kurdish people’ to turn against the secular 
and nationalist ‘corrupt PKK elites’ and undermine the influence of the Kurdish political 
movement. 
Desecuritising the Kurdish issue and giving voice to Kurdish demands was thus a win-win 
strategy for the AKP. It helped them curb the power of the military in politics and also 
extend their popular constituency to Southeast Turkey. As the perception of internal threat 
decreased, so did the perceived necessity for the military to regulate politics.4 European 
Union (EU) integration was also strategically important, not only to limit the army’s author-
ity, but also to desecuritise the Kurdish issue in the framework of wide-scale democratisation.5 
3  Evren Balta Paker and İ. Akça, ‘Beyond Military Tutelage: Analyzing Civil-Military Relations 
under the Justice and Development Party’, in Ebru Canan Sokullu (ed), Debating Security in Turkey: 
Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 77–93.
4  Linda Michaud-Emin, ‘The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Har-
monization Package and its Ramifications for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, Turkish Studies 8 
(2007), pp. 25–42.
5  Ali Resul Usul, ‘The Justice and Development Party and the European Union: From Euro-skepti-
cisim to Euro-Enthusiasm and Euro-Fatigue’, in Ümit Cizre (ed), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: 
The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 175–
197; Erhan Doğan, ‘The Historical and Discursive Roots of the Justice and Development Party’s EU 
Stance’, Turkish Studies 6 (2005), pp. 421–437.
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Both policies established the AKP as a major political force and an actor in the Kurdish 
regions, a fact reinforced by the 10 percent threshold which blocked Kurdish political 
parties from running independently. Throughout the 2000s, the AKP gradually expanded 
its power base by claiming around 50 percent of the Kurdish vote and increasingly viewed 
itself as the sole force capable of resolving the matter at hand, while being very unwilling 
to recognise the agency of Kurdish political forces.
By 2009, the Turkish government had made significant headway in terms of demilitarisa-
tion and was finally free to follow a new political strategy to solve the Kurdish problem. In 
2009, the AKP announced its Kurdish opening. Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisa-
tion (MİT) also initiated negotiations with the PKK, known as the Oslo Talks. The tide of 
peace and optimism soon met rampant nationalism, and the AKP immediately brought the 
opening to a screeching halt, afraid of losing nationalist votes in the subsequent elections. 
The Kurdish problem almost immediately became securitised once again.6 A lawsuit was 
filed by the state against the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), and almost 10,000 
Kurdish policy activists, including elected Kurdish politicians, were detained, thus creating 
a new regime of oppression via judiciary means.7 These trials were considered as a new strat-
egy of repression, where the AKP government resorted to ‘rule by law’, not by rule of law. 
Before the elections of 12 June 2011, the problem was once again rebranded as one of 
terror, not democracy; of violence, not rights. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that 
they would meet only with legal and legitimate Kurdish representatives and suggested that 
the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) was not a suitable interlocutor since it 
did not act ‘independently and autonomously’. Capitalising on this tougher stance towards 
the Kurdish issue, the AKP significantly increased its votes to 49.9 percent in the 2011 
elections. The discourse of this period and the subsequent electoral victory of the AKP gov-
ernment reverberated in that of the period right after the 7 June 2015 elections. 
The Second Opening: A Strategy of Incorporation
This tough stance and discourse towards the Kurdish issue would soon soften after the 
2011 landslide election victory of the AKP. Significantly different from the previous period 
was the new regional dynamics. In fact, this was a period of demonstrations and protests, 
riots and civil wars throughout the countries of the region. The Turkish government soon 
found itself in competition with other regional powers in trying to influence the fate and 
future of the region, directly and indirectly intervening in the domestic policies of Middle 
Eastern states. 
While the region became more conflict-ridden, the AKP government re-launched negoti-
ations with the PKK at the beginning of 2013, with the aim of disarming Turkey’s Kurdish 
regions. On 21 March 2013, Öcalan’s letter to the public was read both in Turkish and 
6  Soner Çağatay, ‘‘Kurdish Opening’ Closed Shut’, Foreign Policy 28 (2009). Available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/28/kurdish_opening_closed_shut?page=0,1 (accessed 24 Octo-
ber 2015). 
7  Aliza Marcus, ‘Troubles in Turkey’s Backyard’, Foreign Policy 29 (2010). Available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/09/troubles_in_turkey_s_backyard?obref=obinsite (accessed 27 
October 2015).
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Kurdish during the historical Nowruz celebrations in Diyarbakır. The letter called for a 
ceasefire that included the disarmament and withdrawal from Turkish soil and an end to 
armed struggle. On 25 April 2013, the PKK announced that it would withdraw all of its 
forces from Turkey. 
However, the Turkish government’s reluctance to enable support for the Kurdish town 
Kobanî, which was under attack from the Islamic State (IS), created a large-scale protest 
cycle among the Kurds of Turkey, especially in the southeast, leaving 42 people dead.8 The 
government issued a curfew in six Kurdish-populated cities of Turkey in order to control 
the growing intensity of the protests.9 
With these protests, it became clear that the Kurdish political movement had transnational 
links transgressing the borders of the Turkish state. Furthermore, it also became clear 
that the Kurdish political movement had turned into the major political alternative of the 
Salafi movements in the Middle East. With major powers such as the US and Russia allying 
themselves with the Kurds against the growing Salafi influence in the region, it reshaped 
Middle Eastern politics in a way that AKP policy-makers had never imagined. Initially, the 
AKP viewed negotiations as a way to stop the growing influence of the Kurdish political 
movement and hoped to unite Turkey’s Kurds around the Muslim Brotherhood, but the 
Kobanî protests proved to AKP elites that neither policy would be feasible and that it would 
be difficult to curb the PKK’s influence in the region as much as in Turkey.10
‘The End’: Renewed Fighting
As expected, in the 2015 general elections the AKP once more took first place, bringing in 
40.9 percent of the votes. But this percentage – which under normal circumstances would 
have been celebrated as a triumph – became the party’s first ‘defeat’, because it was unable 
to form a single government. This ‘first defeat’ of the AKP has largely been perceived as a 
success of the HDP.11 
Maybe one of the most important reasons behind the HDP’s success is the fact that many 
Kurds who had previously voted for the AKP retracted their support. As stated earlier, for 
almost a decade, the AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties had shared the Kurdish vote almost 
equally; however, in this instance, the balance radically tipped towards the HDP.12 In the 
Kurdish provinces, the HDP ranked first virtually everywhere. As one of the main aims of the 
solution processes had been to marginalise pro-Kurdish politics, the AKP soon understood 
that it had created the opposite result and empowered autonomous Kurdish political actors. 
8 ‘6-7 Ekim’in Acı Bilançosu’, Radikal, 12 November 2014. Available at http://www.radikal.com.tr/
turkiye/6_7_ekimin_aci_bilancosu_42_olu-1229423 (accessed 15 January 2015).
9  ‘Curfew in 6 Southeastern Cities’, Bianet English, 7 October 2014. Available at http://bianet.org/
english/world/158990-curfew-in-6-southeastern-cities (accessed 20 January 2015).
10  Evren Balta, ‘The Syrian War and Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict’, in Karen Young (ed), Mapping GCC 
Foreign Policy: Resources, Recipients and Regional Effects, LSE Middle East Centre (2015).
11  The HDP was established in 2012 as an umbrella party for various groups with feminist, green, 
and socialist agendas. Among them, the largest was certainly the pro-Kurdish party BDP. 
12  Cuma Çiçek, ‘1 Kasım 2015 Seçimleri: Politik Kürt Bölgesinde Ak Parti’, Birikim Dergisi, Available at 
http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/7310/1-kasim-2015-secimleri-politik-kurt-bolgesinde-ak-
parti#.VlR8M2QrLaY (accessed 23 November 2015).
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This was a major blow to their populist policy of incorporating Kurds into the party itself. 13
In Kurdish regions, the HDP’s campaign rested on three pillars: autonomy to Kurdish 
culture; solidarity among Kurds – which also included regional solidarity, and regional 
peace. The HDP also successfully incorporated conservative, religious Muslim Kurds in 
the region and attracted rightist and conservative tribes. Right before the June 2015 elec-
tions, the party established social reconciliation and dialogue commissions – also known as 
‘persuasion commissions’. The strategy of negotiating with tribes was frequently used by 
the state as a strategy of incorporation of Kurds. Through their direct collaboration and 
the influence of these tribes, Turkish governments were historically able to rule this con-
tentious periphery.14 This time however, the HDP reached out to these conservative tribes 
and received the support of local mullahs and influential conservative Kurds. As a result, 
many formally pro-AKP tribes changed allegiances right before the elections. This shift was 
alarming, challenging not only the AKP as a party in the region, but also the traditional 
basis of the state rule in the region.15 
After the 7 June elections, even before coalition talks began, the government announced 
that the solution process was over. Similarly to the time surrounding the 2011 elections, the 
AKP government again declared there no longer existed a ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey 
and that ‘all possible rights had already been granted’. As the solution process came to an 
end, the entire country was swept up in renewed conflict. A curfew was imposed in hun-
dreds of predominantly Kurdish districts, the PKK attacked and killed Turkish soldiers and 
police officers, and Turkish nationalist groups attacked many HDP buildings in revenge.16 
Two suicide bombings in Suruç and Ankara killed 104 people and wounded many more.
As the initiatives to form a coalition government failed, new elections were called upon. On 
1 November 2015, voters responded to the increasing violence, conflict and chaos, much 
as they did in 2011. Capitalising on this tougher stance towards the Kurdish issue, the AKP 
managed to gain enough seats in parliament to form a single-party government. 
Right after that win, AKP elites began to use the same rhetoric towards the peace process. 
This rhetoric was based upon the same premise as previously: a conflictual position against 
the PYD, a continued fight against the PKK, and a non-acceptance of the HDP as a legiti-
mate negotiating partner in the Kurdish problem. What remains of the peace process is the 
government granting rights to ordinary Kurds. One government spokesman even stated 
that finally the ‘AKP is now alone with the Kurds’.17
13  Evren Balta, ‘How Turkish Elections Changed the Foreign Policy of Turkey’, openDemocracy, 27 
July 2015. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/evren-balta/how-turkish-elections-changed-
foreign-policy-of-turkey (accessed 24 October 2015).
14  Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish militias in the Ottoman tribal zone (Stanford University 
Press, 2011).
15  Fehim Taştekin, ‘Kurds Abandon AKP’, Al Monitor, 20 May 2015. Available at http://www.al-moni-
tor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/05/turkey-pious-kurds-abandon-akp-in-droves-hdp.html# (accessed 
November 12, 2015)
16  Ömer Tekdemir and Oğuzhan Göksel, ‘A Turbulent Turkey in a Region of Turmoil’, openDemocracy, 
17 September 2015. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/omer-tekdemir-o 
percentC4 percent9Fuzhan-g percentC3 percentB6ksel/turbulent-turkey-in-region-in-turmoil 
(accessed October 24, 2015).
17  ‘Başarı Yan Yana Durmanın Mükefatı’, Al Jazeera Turkish, 2 November 2015. Available at http://
www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/basari-yan-yana-durmanin-mukafati (accessed 24 October 2015).
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Conclusion
The AKP’s populist ideology has inherent limits, as it does not allow for the establishment 
of strong independent intuitional actors or political interlocutors. It is also hostile to a 
checks-and-balances system, whether derived from society or state institutions. Similarly, 
its political stance concerning the Kurdish issue can be described as ‘we are the power and 
the opposition’, which constitutes the political utopia of right-wing populist movements. 
Thus, it is based on the elimination of the Kurdish movement and on singling itself out as 
the only legitimate political actor. The strong belief in monistic and majoritarian absolute 
power does not have space for dialogue, debate, criticism or difference, as any kind of dem-
ocratic politics would require. When Kurdish political actors acted, both domestically and 
regionally, with influence and strength, curbing the power of the AKP, the party resorted 
to repression. This choice has shaped and will continue to shape not only the quality of 
Turkish democracy but also the sense of national belonging and the future of national 
community in Turkey. 
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Introduction
When Syrian refugees1 began arriving on Turkey’s border in 2011, the government wel-
comed them warmly, set up new camps and expected their stay to be temporary. For then 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, welcoming refugees was consistent both 
with his foreign policy of advocating an end to the Assad regime and with the wishes of the 
Sunni Muslim constituency of his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Now entering its 
fifth year, the conflict has become even more complicated. The number of refugees has 
soared to well over 2 million,2 far outstripping the capacity of the camps, and no one expects 
their return any time soon. Turkey faces major challenges – and opportunities – during this 
phase of its refugee policies.
Before turning to the central question, it is important to keep three points in mind. While 
a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Turkey has maintained ‘geographical restric-
tion’ which means that the Convention does not apply to Syrian refugees – nor, for that 
matter, to any non-European refugees. Rather, non-European refugees may stay on the 
condition that they are resettled to third countries. Secondly, Turkey has changed from 
being a country of emigration to one of immigration (and now to one of transit) and has 
taken steps to reform its laws and policies in recognition of this change. But Turkey has 
little experience of integrating refugees or migrants – its prior experience with refugees 
was almost exclusively with those of Turkish descent. An under-appreciated fact is that 
even in the midst of the Syrian refugee influx, Turkey was receiving unprecedented num-
bers of migrants and refugees from other countries. Thirdly, in 1991, 500,000 Iraqi Kurds 
sought to escape the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime by fleeing into Turkey. The 
Turkish government refused to admit them and instead prevailed upon the international 
community to create and police a safe zone inside Northern Iraq: Operation Provide Com-
fort. This safe zone functioned fairly well and the displaced Iraqi Kurds were able to return 
to their communities within months. This experience has undoubtedly had an influence on 
current discussions about safe zones in Syria.
1  While the term ‘refugee’ has a specific legal meaning, this paper uses the term in its more generic 
sense – to refer to all of those fleeing the Syrian conflict, whether legally recognised as refugees or not.
2  ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response’, Interagency Information Sharing Portal, UNHCR. Available at 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (accessed 25 February 2016).
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Welcoming the Refugees, Foreign and Domestic Policies Alligned 
(2011–2013)
The first Syrian refugees arrived on Turkey’s borders on 29 April 2011.3 The Erdoğan gov-
ernment proclaimed an open door policy for Syrians, promised them assistance in terms 
of shelter and services in well-constructed camps near the border, and rebuffed offers of 
assistance from international agencies. In October 2011, the government extended ‘tem-
porary protection’ to Syrian refugees – an official status unlike the ‘guest’ designation used 
by most other countries in the region.4 It was consistent with Erdoğan’s opposition to the 
Assad regime and his calculation that its demise would occur quickly (not an unreasonable 
assumption at the time given the rapidity of regime change in the Arab spring.) This was 
paralleled on the military side with Turkish support for the Free Syrian Army. Turkey’s 
generous policies towards the refugees were also consistent with the country’s emergence 
as an up-and-coming leader in the humanitarian world. In the decade 2003-13, Turkey 
had become the world’s sixth largest governmental humanitarian donour.5 This growing 
humanitarian role was also consistent with the AKP’s emphasis on ummah – the community 
of all Muslims.
In 2012, as the number of refugees increased, the government announced a ‘red line’ in 
terms of the number it could admit; if the figure were to exceed 100,000, Erdoğan said, 
it would be time to move to establish a ‘buffer zone’. This idea of a safe zone inside Syria, 
repeated often in subsequent years, seems also to have been rooted in the Turkish govern-
ment’s desire to prevent Kurds from gaining control over further territory in Syria along 
the Turkish border.6 
In 2013, there were signs that welcoming policies were strained. In February of that year, 
an explosion at a border crossing occured and in May another explosion in Reyhanlı killed 
more than 50 people. As the camps reached capacity and increasing numbers of Syrians 
began living with family or friends, often dispersed throughout the towns, economic pres-
sures mounted – particularly in the border areas. Rent increased and there were reports 
of cultural changes such as polygamy and early marriages taking place. The impact of the 
refugees was tremendous – for example, Reyhanlı, with a population of 63,000 hosted 
100,000 refugees.7 
3  Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Vittoria Federici, Elizabeth Ferris, Sema Karaca, Kemal Kirişci, 
and Elif Özmenek Çarmıklı, ‘Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality’, Brook-
ings Institution, November 2013. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
reports/2013/11/18-syria-turkey-refugees/turkey-and-syrian-refugees_the-limits-of-hospital-
ity-(2014).pdf (accessed 25 February 2016).
4  Note that temporary protection only acquired a truly legal basis with the adoption of the Tempo-
rary Protection Circular in October 2014.
5  ‘Turkey Country Profile’, Global Humanitarian Assistance. Available at http://www.globalhumanitar-
ianassistance.org/countryprofile/turkey (accessed 25 February 2016). Also see Andrea Binder, ‘The 
Shape and Sustainability of Turkey’s Booming Humanitarian Assistance’, International Development 
Policy 5/2, 2014. Available at https://poldev.revues.org/1741 (accessed 25 February 2016).
6  Cited in Kemal Kirisci and Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Not Likely to go Home: Syrian Refugees and the 
Challenges to Turkey – and the International Community’, Brookings Institution: Turkey Project Policy 
Paper 7, September 2015. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/09/syrian-ref-
ugee-international-challenges-ferris-kirisci (accessed 25 February 2016).
7  Ahment Icduygu, ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead’, Transatlantic Council on 
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Turkey also began to operate what were to become massive cross border assistance pro-
grammes inside Syria through a ‘zero point delivery’ system, where the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) delivers aid inside Syria with the support of 
the Turkish Red Crescent and the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and the 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH). This assistance undoubtedly kept many thousands 
of Syrian alive, but given its opaque nature, also gave rise to speculations that Turkey’s true 
intention with this programme was more than purely humanitarian.
Turkey’s open door policy towards the refugees was never truly as open as depicted. While 
the temporary protection policy indicated that Syrians entering via official border cross-
ings (and many entered through non-official ones) and with passports (which many did 
not have), could apply for work permits, in practice this was such a cumbersome process 
that it rarely occurred. Refugees were allowed into the country, but (except in the camps) 
received no financial assistance from the government or international agencies and were 
not allowed to work. As personal savings ran out, they turned to the informal economy for 
jobs and income – with all of the exploitation that this brings.
Commendably, in the midst of this mass influx of refugees, Turkey adopted its first com-
prehensive law on migration in April 2013 which came into effect a year later. This change, 
part of the pre-EU accession process, was a positive one. As Ahmet İçduygu noted, ‘this law 
introduces some landmark reforms that provide Turkey with a modern, efficient and fair 
management system in line with core international and European standards’.8 
By the end of 2013, the Turkish welcome was beginning to wear thin. Turkey was report-
ing the ever-increasing financial costs of caring for the refugees (citing a figure of USD 2 
billion in late 2013, which jumped to USD 8.5 billion in November 2015 though there is 
little clarity about what is included in that figure). Whereas initially Turkey seemed to take 
pride in being able to care for the refugees without international support, by 2015 com-
plaints about the lack of international aid were loud and bitter. Over the course of the last 
two years, the realisation grew that Assad was not going to be quickly overthrown and the 
refugees were not going to return home soon. 
At the same time, the dynamics of the conflict became more complex and Turkey’s role in 
supporting opposition forces became yet more opaque. 
Rising Awareness that the Refugees are not Going Home (2013–2015)
The military gains and brutality of the Islamic State (IS) in mid-2014 both intensified and 
changed the nature of refugee flows. For the first time since 2011, large numbers of Iraqis 
arrived, initially fleeing the IS occupation of Mosul in mid-2014. By June 2015, there 
were some 240,000–250,000 Iraqi refugees.9 Additionally around 190,000 Kurds crossed 
into Turkey, fleeing the fighting between the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and IS in 
and around Kobanî in October 2014, with renewed clashes in 2015 leading to further dis-
placement. While almost all of the initial influxes of refugees had been Syrian and Sunni 
Migration and Migration Policy Institute, April 2015, p. 11. Available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead (accessed 25 February 2016).
8  Ibid, p. 6. 
9  Kirisci and Ferris, ‘Not Likely to Go Home’, p. 4.
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Muslims, now Yazidis and Christians from Iraq as well as Kurds from Northern Syria have 
made the refugee scene more diverse. At the same time, Turkey was receiving large num-
bers of asylum-seekers from other countries, including Afghanistan and Iran.10
Domestically there was growing concern about the economic, social and sectarian impact 
of the refugees. Alawites were reportedly concerned about the Sunni influx in Hatay while 
Turks welcomed ethnic Turkmen.11 As İçduygu writes:
A recent poll found that 70 percent of the host population in the localities of South-
eastern Turkey with a high percentage of Syrian refugees believed that Syrians 
constituted a security threat while more than three-fifths of Turkey’s overall popula-
tion thought they committed crimes and were detrimental to public order and peace 
wherever they were settled.12 
Both domestically and internationally the Kurdish factor was key in government policy 
towards Syrian refugees. Kurds were alarmed at what they saw as the reluctance of the 
government to support them against IS attacks on Kobanî in June 2015 while the gov-
ernment was concerned with the prospects of large-scale influx of Kurdish refugees into 
Turkey. The gains by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in the June 2015 election was 
seen by some as a manifestation of Kurdish discontent with foreign policy. Meanwhile the 
political polarisation resulting from Erdoğan’s policies, reports of human rights abuses, 
the challenge of a multi-country Kurdish insurgency, attacks by IS on areas close to Tur-
key’s border and violence between pro-and anti-AKP factions13 created a volatile situation. 
The November 2015 elections in which Erdoğan’s AKP party won a majority of the votes 
is actually fairly positive for refugees, since the AKP, with its strong base among religious 
conservatives, has been more supportive of a welcoming refugee policy than other political 
parties as secular Turks, Alevis and Kurds feared the potential of large numbers of Sunni 
Arab refugees changing the demographics of local society and politics.14
While Erdoğan’s opposition to the Assad regime is well-known, there have been persistent 
reports of Turkish support for IS.15 If true, this creates quite a paradoxical situation. On 
the one hand, Turkey continues to have a rhetoric of supporting refugees from IS while, at 
the same time, it provides some degree of support to the militant group, allowing foreign 
fighters, arms and money to pass through Turkey. This paradoxical hypocritical policy is 
reinforced by a July 2015 agreement to allow US forces to use Turkish airbases for attacks 
on IS.16 
10 ‘Turkey Country Operations Profile 2015’, UNHCR. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/pag-
es/49e48e0fa7f.html (accessed 25 February 2016).
11  Icduygu, ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead’, p. 10.
12  Ibid., pp. 10–11. 
13  Sonar Cagaptay, ‘Turkey is in Serious Trouble’, The Atlantic, 5 October 2015. Available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/turkey-isis-russia-pkk/408988/ (accessed 25 Feb-
ruary 2016).
14  Kirisci and Ferris, ‘Not likely to go home’.
15  David Graeber, ‘Turkey could cut off Islamic State’s supply lines. So why doesn’t it?’ The Guardian, 
18 November 2015. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/18/turkey-
cut-islamic-state-supply-lines-Erdoğan-isis (accessed 25 February 2016).
16  Cagaptay, ‘Turkey is in Serious Trouble’.
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In terms of its policies towards the now over 2 million refugees, Turkey took a number of 
positive steps in the 2014-15 period, including engaging international actors it had once 
scorned and allowing INGOs to register and begin aid programmes for refugees. The 
Ministry of Education moved to close the informal Syrian schools which had emerged and 
to bring the refugees into the country’s educational system – although two-thirds of Syrian 
children remain out of school. The refugee registration system was improved and in spring 
2015, before the elections, legislation was introduced that would allow Syrians the possibil-
ity of entering the labour market – although the policies have yet to be approved. These 
changes seem to reflect a recognition that the refugees were not going to return and that 
steps were needed to ensure their integration into Turkish society. For example, 35,000 
Syrian refugees have now given birth in Turkey.17
Meanwhile, the Turkish government continues to support the idea of establishing a safe 
zone inside Syria, albeit without much uptake by major powers. The idea may have had 
more to do with the Turkish government wanting to prevent Kurds from gaining control 
of further territory in Syria along the Turkish border and with domestic politics than with 
their concern for refugees. It may also have been motivated by accusations that the PYD 
was pursuing ethnic cleansing against Arabs and Turkmen in the region.18
Europe and the Future
In August 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis took on a new dimension with the massive migra-
tion of tens of thousands – and then hundreds of thousands – of refugees moving through 
Turkey to Germany and other northern European countries. These were mixed migration 
movements with migrants and asylum-seekers from many other nationalities taking advan-
tage of the more open European borders to press their claims. 
As European governments and the European Union (EU) struggled to respond to the 
refugee flow, Turkey found itself in a strong bargaining position. The European Union 
needed Turkey and Erdoğan was ready to seize the opportunity. The 15 October 2015 
EU summit on migration focused not on how to relocate refugees within the EU, but on 
Turkey. Nearly four-fifths of the 615,000 people arriving in Europe by sea had come via 
Turkey (a figure that at the time of this writing is edging toward 900,000.) German Chance-
lor Angela Merkel, who had opposed Turkey’s EU membership bid in 2005 and blocked 
new accession talks in 2013 because of human rights concerns, flew to Ankara to talk with 
the Turkish authorities. She was now open to discussions on ending visa requirements for 
Turks seeking to travel to Europe and the EU was ready to increase aid to support refu-
gees in Turkey – both of which were long-standing Turkish demands. Turkey was now in a 
strong position and agreement was quickly reached that a substantial aid package would be 
put together (although discussions continue on the specific amounts. In spite of Western 
17  Oytun Orham and Sabiha Senyucel Gundogar, ‘Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey’, Orsam, 
January 2015. Available at http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/201518_rapor195ing.
pdf (accessed 25 February 2016). Note that this figure seems to have increased to 60,000. Ömür 
Budak, ‘Global migrant crisis requires global effort’, The Boston Globe, 14 November 2015. Avail-
able at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/11/14/global-migrant-crisis-requires-global-effort/
S4DVxSUm4NNJ9vWLhKVrpJ/story.html?event=event25 (accessed 25 February 2016).
18  Kirisci and Ferris, ‘Not Likely to go Home’, p. 5.
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concerns about violence in Turkey and the crackdown on human rights, Erdoğan is now in 
strong position vis-à-vis Europe.19
There seems to be an assumption that Turkey can – and should – control or stop the flow 
of refugees through its territory to Europe. If Turkey uses the additional resources to 
improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees within its borders and allows them access 
to employment, this might lead some Syrians to decide to remain in Turkey. But if the 
expectation is that the Turkish government will physically deter Syrians from moving on to 
Greece, then this raises a serious human rights issue. European governments are anxious 
to have a country to which they can return Syrians, especially those whose claim for asylum 
have been rejected, without having to send them directly back to Syria. But as Amnesty 
International has pointed out, Turkey isn’t a ‘safe country’ for everyone and in fact, histor-
ically one in four Turkish asylum-seekers has been granted asylum in Europe.20 
On World Refugee Day 2015, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres 
referred to Turkey as a great example for other countries in the world. However, the 
picture has become more complicated since then with growing despair among refugees 
and growing anti-Syrian sentiment.21 Turkey is in a strong position to take advantage of 
European desperation to stem the flow of refugees. But the decisions that Turkey and EU 
member states take in the coming months will have long-term consequences for refugees, 
for Turkey–EU relations and indeed for the European Union itself. 
19  Naina Bajekal, ‘Why the EU is Offering Turkey Billions to Deal with Refugees’, Time, 19 Octo-
ber 2015. Available at http://time.com/4076484/turkey-eu-billions-dollars-refugee-slow/ (accessed 25 
February 2016).
20  ‘Merkel Must Ensure Rights of Refugee Rights Not Cut Out of an EU-Turkey Deal’, Amnesty 
International, 17 October 2015. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/turkey-
merkel-must-ensure-rights-of-refugees-not-cut-out-of-eu-turkey-deal/ (accessed 25 February 2016). 
21  Omar Ghabra, ‘Why Syrian Refugees in Turkey Are Leaving for Europe’, The Nation, 28 September 
2015. Available at http://www.thenation.com/article/why-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-are-leaving-for-
europe/ (accessed 25 February 2016).
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The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was Turkish foreign minister Feridun 
Sinirlioğlu’s first foreign visit following the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) elec-
toral victory on 1 November 2015. In his address at Erbil’s Middle East Research Institute 
(MERI) on 4 November, he commended the role played by the KRG’s Peshmerga in the 
struggle against the Islamic State (IS), insisted that ‘Turkey is steadfast in its support for 
Iraq and the KRG in the fight against terrorism’, and reminded his hosts that Turkey’s 
‘military and humanitarian assistance…has started from the very beginning of the crisis’. 
He also referred to Ankara’s determination to further develop the successful economic 
relationship with Erbil.1
Sinirlioğlu’s reference to economic cooperation between Erbil and Ankara was a recogni-
tion of the importance of oil exports from the KRG’s oil fields via a newly built pipeline 
to Ceyhan on the Turkish coast. The pipeline became active in May 2014, in the face of 
opposition from both Baghdad and Washington,2 and towards the end of 2015 oil was 
flowing at the rate of over 500,000 barrels per day, one seventh of the Iraqi total. The 
earnings from these sales has enabled Erbil to avert the real possibility of a complete finan-
cial crash as a consequence of its continuing budgetary and oil trade disagreements with 
Baghdad and of large-scale corruption and nepotism. Indeed, in 2014 oil earnings from 
exports via the Ceyhan pipeline were used as collateral to secure a USD 3 billion loan, 
much of it from Turkish sources. Unsurprisingly in November 2015 the KRG’s minister for 
natural resources, Ashti Hawrami, noted how ‘incredibly supportive’ Turkey had been and 
described the Erbil–Ankara relationship as ‘strategic’ – which was far from the first time a 
KRG official had used the term.3
Indeed, Hawrami had himself used the term at an address to a MERI forum back in Novem-
ber 2014, and argued that ‘Turkey needs Kurdistan, perhaps at least as much as we need 
Turkey’. On that occasion, though, he conceded that there were doubters who regarded 
1  ‘Speech by H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the MERI Forum’, 
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 November 2015. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
speech-by-h_e_-mr_-feridun-sinirlio percentC4 percent9Flu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-
at-the-meri-_middle-east-research-institute_-forum_-4-november-2015_-erbil.en.mfa (accessed 22 
November 2015).
2  For more details see Bill Park, ‘Turkey-Kurdistan Regional Government relations after the US 
withdrawal from Iraq: putting the Kurds on the map?’, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army war College, 
2014, pp. 22–33. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pu-
bID=1190 (accessed 18 February 2016). 
3 Dmitry Zhdannikov, ‘Exclusive: How Kurdistan bypassed Baghdad and sold oil on 
global markets’, Reuters, 17 November 2015. Available at http://mobile.reuters.com/article/
idUSKCN0T61HH20151117 (accessed 22 November 2015). 
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Turkey’s commitment to the KRG as ‘only skin deep’.4 These doubts relate to non-energy 
Turkey–KRG relations, and one such doubter is Masrour Barzani, son of the KRG presi-
dent Massoud Barzani and chief of the KRG’s intelligence services. In an interview he gave 
in July 2015 he observed that in August 2014 ‘when the Kurds came under attack from [IS] 
the expectation was that Turkey would play a much bigger role by actively engaging and 
providing the support that the Kurds needed’. In a reference to Turkey’s contribution to 
the international coalition against IS he expressed the view that ‘they should be doing a 
lot more than they are doing now’.5 This echoed comments made by president Barzani’s 
influential chief of staff Fuad Hussein soon after the IS threat to the KRG, when he said of 
Turkey that, notwithstanding the political and economic relationship that had been built 
up between Erbil and Ankara, ‘our security was under threat, but still we did not receive 
any support from Turkey’ – in contrast to the assistance provided by the US, other western 
states and indeed Iran.6 Masrour Barzani also criticised Ankara’s approach to Kurdish 
control of the Syrian-Kurdish border, asserting that ‘the Turks should be more concerned 
about having IS on the borders of Turkey. Indeed, Turkish reaction to this should be one 
of relief that Kurds, as friends of the Turks, are controlling the border rather than IS, 
which is the enemy of the entire world’.7
Kurds, whether in Iraq, Syria or Turkey itself, are not alone in their disappointment with 
Ankara’s relationship with IS, or in their tendency to doubt the sincerity of Ankara’s recently 
intensified rhetoric against IS. For Kurds this matters because they have found themselves 
in the forefront of the anti-IS struggle. Turkey has long been suspected of at best turning 
a blind eye to IS and other jihadi group’s movement of goods and people across its border 
with Syria, and these suspicions are far from quelled.8 Its actions against IS in Syria have 
been very limited, and in Iraq more or less non-existent, in contrast to many of its NATO 
allies and neighbours. Although Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has insisted 
Ankara has no objections to arming Iraq’s Peshmerga,9 and there has been some limited 
4  ‘Baghdad-KRG Relations, between Interdependence and Independence: Part 3: Intervention of 
Ashty Hawrami (Minister NR, KRG)’, Middle East Research Institute, 20 November 2014. Available at 
http://www.meri-k.org/multimedia/meri-forum-2014-s8-baghdad-krg-relations-part-3/ (accessed 22 
November 2015).
5  Amberin Zaman, ‘Masrour Barzani: Kurdish Independence Would Help Defeat IS’, Al Monitor, 2 
July 2015. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-iraq-syria-kurdish-
independence-help-war-against-isis.html (accessed 22 November 2015).
6  Hevidar Ahmed, ‘Senior Kurdistan Official: IS Was at Erbil’s Gates, Turkey Did Not Help’, Rudaw, 
16 September 2014. Available at http://rudaw.net/english/interview/16092014 (accessed 22 November 
2014). Dorian Jones, ‘Islamic state tests Turkey-Iraqi Kurd ties’, Voice of America News, 12 September 
2014. Available at http://www.voanews.com/content/islamic-state-tests-turkey-iraqi-kurd-tie/2447851.
html (accessed 22 November 2014).
7  Zaman, ‘Masrour Barzani: Kurdish Independence Would Help Defeat IS’. 
8  For a recent report along these lines, see Nafeez Ahmed, ‘NATO is harbouring the Islamic state’, 
Insurge Intelligence, 19 November 2015. Available at https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/europe-
is-harbouring-the-islamic-state-s-backers-d24db3a24a40#.4674kgigu (accessed 23 November 2015). 
For a useful compilation of allegations, suspicions and evidence, see David. L Phillips ‘Research 
Paper: ISIS-Turkey Links’, Huffington Post, 9 November 2014. Available at http://www.huffington-
post.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html (accessed 7 February 2015).
9  ‘Davutoğlu: Turkey supports US arming Peshmerga, not PKK’, Rudaw, 10 November 2015. Avail-
able at http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/10112015 (accessed 23 November 2015). 
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Turkish training of Peshmerga forces and supplies of non-lethal equipment, Ankara has 
taken the backseat in the training and arming of the KRG’s forces. Thus the Kurdistan 
Training Coordination Center (KTCC) that was set up at the beginning of 2015 and which 
forms part of the Operation Inherent Resolve multinational coalition, currently features 
Italian, British, Dutch, German, Norwegian and Finnish as well as US trainers.10 Some of 
those countries, as well as others such as Australia and the Czech Republic, have also been 
at the forefront of western arming of the Peshmerga.11
The KRG leadership has also been compromised by the reignition of Ankara’s war against 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and its hostility to Syria’s Democratic Union Party 
(PYD). The summer 2015 resumption of Turkish bombing raids against PKK bases in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, which has resulted in the deaths of a number of Iraq Kurdish civilians and 
prompted widespread Kurdish outrage, led president Barzani to issue a statement saying, 
‘we condemn this bombardment that led to the martyrdom of people from the Kurdis-
tan Region and call on Turkey not to bombard civilians again’. As Turkey’s former consul 
general to the KRG, Aydın Selcen expressed it, ‘an anti-PKK campaign will never enjoy 
popular support among the KRG public’.12 Although Turkey subsequently aligned itself 
more explicitly with the anti-IS coalition, not least by allowing US bombers and armed 
drones to attack IS targets from Turkey’s Incirlik airbase,13 but also by rounding up sus-
pected IS sympathisers in Turkey, the onslaught against the PKK in south eastern Turkey 
and inside KRG territory has been far more ferocious, and has involved numerous bomb-
ing raids, brutal curfews, and detentions of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) officials.
Ankara’s hostility towards the PYD has not softened neither, despite US reliance on and 
support for the PYD’s efforts against IS in Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
had earlier offered an insight into Ankara’s thinking with his comment that ‘for us, the 
PKK is the same as ISIL. It is wrong to consider them as different from each other’.14 
10  Maj. Antonio Bernardo, ‘Multiple coalition countries training Iraqi forces’, CJTF-OIR Public 
Affairs, United States Central Command. Available at http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/multi-
ple-coalition-countries-training-iraqi-forces (accessed 23 November 2015). 
11  ‘Arming Iraq’s Kurds: fighting IS, inviting conflict’, International Crisis Group: Middle East Report 
158, 12 May 2015. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle percent20East 
percent20North percent20Africa/Iraq percent20Syria percent20Lebanon/Iraq/158-arming-iraq-
s-kurds-fighting-is-inviting-conflict.pdf (accessed 8 April 2016). For some dissenting view to this 
report’s conclusion that the KDP has disproportionately benefitted from these equipment pro-
grammes at the expense of the PUK, see ‘Have the Kurdish militias battling IS lost their way?’, 
Radio Free Europe, 15 May 2015. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-kurdish-mili-
tias-icg-report/27018967.html (accessed 23 November 2015). 
12 Amberin Zaman, ‘The Iraqi Kurds’ waning love affair with Turkey’, 1 September 2015, Al Monitor. 
Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/turkey-iraq-kurdistan-krg-pkk-love-affair-
over.html (accessed 22 November 2015). 
13  Aaron Stein, ‘The Incirlik expansion and and the US-Turkish strategy to fight ISIS’, Atlan-
tic Council, 8 October 2015. Available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/
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He also asserted that the PKK and the PYD are one and the same organisation, and on 
that basis opposed Washington’s air drops to the PYD, fearing the arms might fall into the 
PKK’s hands. Washington was obliged to air drop military supplies to the PYD defenders 
of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobanî, which was besieged by IS forces, while the Turkish 
military looked on and Erdoğan loudly criticised Washington’s action.15 Turkey sought to 
prevent Turkish Kurds from crossing the border to join in the defence of Kobanî (and has 
been reluctant to allow the bodies of Turkish Kurds killed fighting IS in Syria to be repatri-
ated) although it did eventually agree to allow, under US pressure,16 a small Iraqi Kurdish 
Peshmerga force to transit Turkish territory and help lift the IS siege – a move apparently 
fiercely resisted by the Turkish military.17 Kobanî eventually fell to the PYD in early 2015. 
When in June 2015 Syrian Kurdish forces captured – with US help – the border town of 
Tal Abyad, Erdoğan chose to express his concern about the possible ‘creation of a structure 
that threatens our borders’,18 a concern he had not expressed during the over a year that 
the town had been under IS control.
Of course, Barzani has also long been irritated by the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq,19 
and to some extent his support for Turkey’s peace process with the PKK has stemmed 
from his desire to rid his territory of PKK fighters and of the attention they attracted, 
from Turkey and Iran. Indeed in November 2013 Barzani and Erdoğan even shared a 
platform in Turkey’s overwhelmingly Kurdish city of Diyarbakır, where Barzani expressed 
his support for Turkey’s Kurdish peace process and acclaimed the brotherhood between 
Turks and Kurds.20 Yet today the Turkish government does not appear at all ready to 
resume peace talks with the PKK. Barzani also wants to present himself as the true symbol 
of Kurdish nationalism, and this consideration, combined with pressure from Ankara, has 
meant that his approach to the PYD in particular has overlapped with that of Turkey. 
Barzani’s unease with the possible emergence of the PKK/PYD intensified in light of the 
widespread sympathy for the PYD’s spirited defence of Kobanî and against IS in Syria 
generally, and the role played by PKK and PYD fighters in Sinjar and Makhmur in Iraqi 
Kurdistan in the wake of their desertion by Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga in the face of an IS 
attack. More recently it again surfaced in the run-up to the liberation of Sinjar, which was 
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delayed by differences over the role the PKK/PYD might play.21 The PYD had resisted 
Barzani’s attempts to subordinate it to the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a coalition of 
Syrian Kurdish groups that was formed in 2011 under Barzani’s sponsorship,22 although in 
2014 it did enter a power-sharing arrangement with Barzani-sponsored Kurdish groups.23 
Erbil initially offered no assistance to PYD forces, and even sought to obstruct them from 
using KRG territory. Indeed, the KRG, like Turkey, closed its border with Syria even as the 
PYD was battling jihadi elements.24 
Iraqi Kurds are surely as capable as Turkish and Syrian Kurds in comparing Ankara’s 
response to threats to – and its military training of – Syria’s Turkmen, with its indifference 
towards the fate of the inhabitants of Kobanî. In response to reported Russian bomb-
ing of Turkmen villages, Ankara not only summoned the Russian ambassador but also 
raised the issue to the UN.25 Within a couple of days Turkey shot down a Russian air force 
jet, ostensibly because it intruded Turkish air space. This was immediately followed by 
an intensification of Russian bombardment of Syrian Turkmen fighters right up against 
the Turkish border. Kurds might recall the way in which Turkey once sought to similarly 
manipulate the Turkmen issue in the Kurdish-controlled area of Iraq as a means of weak-
ening Kurdish claims.26
KRG leaders, both of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) but even more so of the Patri-
otic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have always appreciated their land-locked vulnerability to 
the policies of their neighbours, and the dangers of putting all their eggs in one basket. 
However, when Turkey emerged as the KRG’s chief economic partner, and to some extent 
alternative to Baghdad, Erbil had little choice or hesitation in embracing the relationship. 
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Although Turkey always made clear its support for Iraq’s territorial integrity and its con-
tinued commitment to Baghdad – as again evidenced by foreign minister Sinirlioğlu’s 
phrasing in November 2015 – Ankara also appeared to be positioning itself against the 
prospect of a meltdown of the Iraqi state. In any case, Erbil and Ankara developed a mutu-
ally beneficial energy relationship which has survived the recent shocks. Furthermore, the 
widespread corruption that characterises the KRG is especially rife in the energy industry, 
reportedly benefits KDP more than PUK figures – thus adding to tension between them 
over access to power and arms27 – and is widely believed to involve the presidents of both 
the KRG and Turkey and their families. To some extent, the Erbil–Ankara relationship is 
personalised, and is a relationship between Ankara and the KDP specifically rather than 
the wider KRG leadership. The PUK has always been closer than to KDP to Tehran and 
Baghdad, and more skeptical about Turkey – perhaps in part because it has been relatively 
excluded from the spoils.28 
However, Barzani and others in the KRG leadership remain keen to preserve the advan-
tageous relationship with Ankara and to maintain the KRG’s and their own economic 
well-being; they need Turkey. There can be little doubt that Turkey’s failure to come to 
the KRG’s aid, its ambiguous stance towards IS, and the ferocity of its opposition to both 
the PKK and the PYD, has surely been a chastening experience for Erbil. In addition to 
worsening relationships between its Turkish ally and its fellow Kurds, Erbil may in the 
future also have to contend with greater Iranian influence in Iraq and even within the 
KRG, and with a powerful Shiʿa militia presence. It already looks likely that, when and 
if IS is ever degraded, and possibly even before that, the KRG’s territorial claims and its 
determination to maximise its autonomy will have to be defended against Shiʿa challenges, 
perhaps backed by Tehran. These tensions have recently manifested themselves in Pesh-
merga–Shiʿa militia fire fights around Tuz Kharmato29 and tensions in Kirkuk.30 Erbil has 
surely now concluded that Ankara might limit the risks it is prepared to take on the KRG’s 
behalf, and that for Ankara the relationship is important, but possibly compartmental-
ised rather than ‘strategic’. Regional circumstances and its reservations concerning Ankara 
have enabled Erbil to cultivate a wider network of allies, including in the West. Erbil might 
also ponder the mercurial manner in which Turkey – or President Erdoğan – shifted from 
being the KRG’s sworn enemy to its seemingly most ardent suitor. Assad has been sub-
jected to a similar experience. Turkey can seem both unpredictable and ill-advised in its 
behaviour, and Erbil has surely taken note. 
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Although we can’t speak of a federal region before 2003, even as early as 1992, the Kurd-
istan Democratic Party (KDP) had taken over the border between Turkey and Iraq and so 
the issue was well known to Turkey. Initial contact was made by the Special Forces and the 
army – and naturally by the intelligence service. Foreign Ministry officials were flown in 
and out by Turkish army helicopters to meet with KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) leadership. 
As Habur fell under the fairly efficient control of the KDP, regional trade began. The 
Oil For Food programme helped strenghthen that flow. The foundation of the post-2003 
decade can be noted much earlier, just without the institutions that later surrounded it. 
Even today’s outlawed from Turkey Gülen Movement had got themselves established at 
that time. 
In the mid-nineties, the Turkish army increased its presence inside Iraqi Kurdistan to 
60,000 men. This was intended to prevent the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) from gain-
ing foothold either in the mountainous areas or the cities. 
At the time when Prime Minister Erdoğan paid a visit to Baghdad and announced the deci-
sion of the government to open a consulate in Erbil, Turkey had already opened consulates 
in Basra and Mosul – in addition of course to the Embassy in Baghdad. Turkish officials 
even cajoled large Istanbul-based businesses – such as construction and energy companies 
– to consider coming to Kurdistan. 
That was the uncharted draft of future diplomacy – later on to be affectionately rebaptised 
as the ‘mutual economic dependence’ model. In many cases, construction contracts and 
the export of manufactured or non-manufactured products would be statistically termed 
‘investment’. 
Politically speaking, something new was unfolding. Turkey, considered the sworn enemy 
of the Kurds in many quarters, made a quick comeback owing to its geographic proximity 
to – and economic complementarity with – the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Turkish Airlines 
started flying to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, three regular and three ‘İslamic’ banks opened 
branches, a Trade Attaché was assigned to the Consulate, Turkey began distributing long-
term multiple entry visas free of charge, and real investment began to take place. 
In the following months Trade, Finance, National Education, Foreign, Development min-
isters all visited Erbil, and MPs attended KDP and PUK party congresses, while governors 
from various provinces led business delegations to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Then there was the first ever visit of a Turkish prime minister to Erbil. Erbil’s streets were 
for once decorated with Turkish flags, and the finance delivered half his public speech 
in Kurdish.
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But difficulties arose. While officials in Ankara were allowed to use the term ‘KRG’, the 
word ‘Kurdistan’ remained problematic. The now warm relations between Ankara and 
Erbil did not acquire an institutional outlook. Ankara shied away from recognising the fed-
eral region’s legal status. When once prodded towards that direction, then finance minister 
Davutoğlu questioned the value of such recognition. 
Ankara also played to the faultline, attempting to divide the KDP north from the PUK/
Gorran south. In time, the KDP acquired more than a primus inter pares status, not only 
causing frustration among other political parties but causing people to question Ankara’s 
intentions. 
When trucks loaded with oil began crossing boarders from the KRG to Turkey, opportuni-
ties were unlocked in Ankara. In hindsight we can suggest that the oil business became for 
like-minded communities in Erbil and in Ankara the most valuable lobbying asset for a rap-
prochement. However the apogee of that development was the building of Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
pipeline to Turkey – as well as the Turkish Energy Company’s partnership with Exxon. This 
oil was sourced not only in oil fields in Kurdistan ‘proper’, but also in so-called ‘disputed’ 
territories. Yesterday’s red line became the throbbing heart of cooperation and integration.
In June 2014, the Islamic State (IS) attacked Mosul and the Iraqi army left Kirkuk. In 
one day, the Kurds took over the remaining fields of Kirkuk, and a one-hundred-year old 
dream was realised. Although Ankara didn’t step in support of the Kurds, the IS attack on 
Mosul turned out to be godsent for the KRG. 
Events took a different turn, however, when IS attacked Erbil. Initially it seriously strained 
Turkey–KRG relations as the former was seen as being late rushing to the rescue of the latter, 
and the quality of that rescue was not initially up to the latter’s expectations. In time, Turkey’s 
response improved, with wounded Peshmergas being transported to Turkey, ammunition 
and light weaponry beginning to be brought down through the Habur border gate, and some 
financial support finding its way to Erbil. The flow of oil continued uninterrupted. 
In November 2014, Prime Minister Davutoğlu was pictured visiting a military camp 
near Erbil where a Turkish Army unit trained the Peshmerga, showing the restoration of 
better relations. 
At present, Turkey maintains an armoured battalion at Bamerne, elements of that tank 
battalion at Amadiya and Suri, and a commando battalion at Kanimasi, together with 
130 special forces based in Erbil, Selahaddin, Zakho, Duhok, Batufa, Sulaymaniyah and 
Amadiya as liaison teams. With the latest reinforcement in Bashiqa, the number of uni-
formed Turkish personnel consists of around 3,000 members.
The priority of the Turkish Armed Forces has been to prevent the PKK armed elements 
from crossing into Turkey from their bases in the mountainous triangular area in the 
north-eastern corner of Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus the army did not quite play along with the 
KRG, and why the news of Turkish army officers training Peshmerga is more political news 
than military. 
Elsewhere Peshmerga received training from the Turkish army in Duhok, Erbil and Diyala 
too. In Bashiqa, 20km north of Mosul, around 80 Turkish Special Forces personnel have 
trained mostly Sunni Arabs but also some Turkmen and Peshmerga units for over a year. 
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At present, a 400-strong commando detachment supported by 25 M-60 A3 tanks brought 
the number of Turkish military personnel at that camp up to about 600. Not sufficient for 
offensive action perhaps, yet proof enough that Turkey unilaterally acted to turn the tem-
porary training camp in Bashiqa into a permanent military base.
Looking at the so-called ‘peace process’ in Turkey, relations between the KDP and the PKK 
have always been strained. At the same time, ever since the internecine civil war among the 
KDP and PUK called ‘brakuji’, there has been a strong will on the KDP side to avoid fight-
ing against its own brethren. Indeed, during the liberation of Shengal, KDP Peshmerga 
avoided clashing with HPG forces even though they were far superior in numbers. 
To conclude, Turkey’s recurrent rhetoric of constantly underlining the ultimate impor-
tance of Iraq’s territorial integrity and national unity appears increasingly detached from 
its actions on the ground. Recent action taken to reinforce the Bashiqa military base stands 
as a testimony to that. Ankara seems to be more and more willing to forsake the usual pro-
forma niceties – such as going through Baghdad in order to deal with Erbil. 
Today, the KRG is going through what is probably the worst financial crisis of its short 
history. Among its other friends, the KRG is most needful of Turkey’s help in order to 
navigate these dire straits, and Ankara does whatever it can. 
Around half of the 30–40 million of the Kurdish population are Turkish citizens. Turkey 
and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region are like Siamese twins, bound not by the hip but by their 
geographic location, ethnic affinities and economic complementarity. 
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What is Turkey’s Rojava policy? The short answer, in my opinion, is that it doesn’t have 
one – in the sense that in order to have a policy towards a political entity, you have to first 
accept its existence. Refusing to deal with Rojava administrations which control a significant 
amount of Syria’s border with Turkey is not a policy. Rojava (‘West’ in Kurdish and used to 
denote Western Kurdistan) in Turkey’s eyes shouldn’t exist. This paper gives a brief account 
of the attitudes of regional and global forces towards the Syrian Kurds, of how Rojava came 
into being, how it has interacted with Turkey, and how it has influenced Turkey’s Kurdish 
politics. It concludes by discussing a few options Turkey now has in the region.
Turkey, objectively, is in a very advantageous position with regards to influence in Rojava. 
However, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has been so sensitive to 
threats from that region that it has failed to perceive the opportunities lying alongside them.
In contrast to Turkey, the United States has a healthy relationship with Rojava. US military 
officials compete with each other in praising the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the pre-
dominantly Kurdish armed forces of the region. They also cooperate at a high level with 
the group against the Islamic State (IS). Russia also has a relatively positive Rojava policy, 
with Russian officials being the first to extend support for the Kurds as part of the Geneva 
meetings, and with Putin even praising the YPG in his UN speech. Assad has a very clever 
Rojava policy, encouraging Kurds not to be part of a foreign-supported anti-Assad alli-
ance. Iran also has a Rojava policy, a policy it implements mostly via its relations with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the main force in Rojava, facilitating the group’s war with 
Turkey in order to curb its ambitions in Syria. Even the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), 
which is a far smaller actor, has a more sensible Rojava policy than Turkey. The KDP 
attempts to negotiate with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the main political force and 
PKK ally in Rojava. On several occasions the KDP demanded concrete concessions from 
Rojava administrations in exchange for political, financial and military support from the 
KDP. Demands such as the one asking for control of the oil-rich Jizira area in north-eastern 
Syria may have been too much, but it was at least an attempt at negotiation.
What is it that the Turkish government demands from Rojava? Right from the start of the 
militarisation of the Syrian uprising, Turkey’s demands have been for the PYD to join the 
Free Syrian Army and its political organisations, which offered no more political rights to 
Kurds than the Assad government did. So the Turkish position has been that the Rojava 
administration should cease to exist. 
Contrastingly, the Turkish government sees a partner in the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) of Iraqi Kurdistan. It also increasingly regards the KDP as it’s best instrument against 
PKK-linked Kurds in Syria. Officially, the only possible solution in the mind of the Turkish 
government in regards to Turkey’s Syrian Kurdish problem is to have the Iraqi Kurdish 
KDP’s sister organisations gain more power in Syria – as well as in Turkey – in order to 
balance the power of the PKK.
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Turkey’s ambiguous attitude towards Rojava is also the main reason for its ambiguous rela-
tionship with Islamist groups in Syria, as Turkish officials see the rising Islamist groups in 
northern Syria as powers to balance the Kurds.
Kurds made up of 10 percent of the Syrian population before the civil war, but they only 
became a significant political force after the beginning of the uprising in 2011.
There had been Kurdish opposition parties in Syria since 1957, when the Kurdistan Demo-
cratic Party of Syria (KDPS) was founded. That was six years before the Syrian Baʿath coup. 
But KDPS failed to present powerful opposition to the Baʿath regime. It is affiliated to Iraqi 
KDP – and as these opposition parties allied, so did the regimes, with the Syrian regime 
providing troops in Iraq’s fight against the Kurds while repressing its own Kurds.
The PKK, on the other hand, has been one of the strongest Kurdish political groups in 
Syria since the early 1980s. The besieged town of Kobanî on the Turkish border was the 
first place Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, took shelter when he fled Turkey 
in anticipation of the military coup of 1979.
However, the PKK didn’t organise Kurds against the Assad regime, since its primary target 
was Turkey. During the following decades, thousands of Syrian Kurds joined the PKK to 
fight against the Turkish army. Many of those Syrian Kurds rose to become top military 
and political leaders within the PKK. Two consecutive heads of the PKK’s armed wing were 
Syrian Kurds and the commander who accompanied the PYD co-leader, Asya Abdullah, 
when she met President Hollande was a former PKK commander.
The year 1998 saw the first serious attempt by the PKK to organise Kurds against the 
Syrian regime – that same year Abdullah Öcalan was forced out of Syria, suggesting to his 
comrades that they should form an organisation backed by the PKK against Hafez al Assad. 
An organisation was quickly set up by people under his influence and that of the PKK, 
including Salih Muslim, the co-leader of the main Syrian Kurdish party. Syrian intelligence 
was skilful in infiltrating the organisation, killing some leading members and eventually 
destroying it.
A second attempt was made in 2003, this time under the name of the PYD and in the Qandil 
mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, in the area under the control of the PKK. At this time, still 
eight years ahead of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the Syrian regime’s attempts were 
less successful at degrading the organisation. In March 2004, a major Kurdish uprising 
took place in Qamishli following a probable government-organised provocation at a foot-
ball match.
These were the years when Turkish and Syrian governments became closer and started 
cooperating against Kurds. The PYD-led Kurdish opposition continued underground 
mobilisation in Syria.
This status quo began to change dramatically after March 2011, with the arrival of the 
so-called Arab Spring to Syria. The PYD was more efficient in organising itself then most 
other Syrian movements, let alone other Kurdish parties like KDPS, the Kurdish Union 
Party (Yekiti) and the Kurdish Freedom Party (Azadi). Other Kurdish parties were too 
late to start organising themselves when the PYD took control of most Kurdish areas and 
established self-governing bodies in the form of non-contiguous cantons in Efrin, Kobanî 
and Jizira across northern Syria.
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Because the Kurdish areas in Syria were at a distance from the centres of regime power, 
they were spared the brunt of regime attacks as the army withdrew to concentrate on other 
regions. Even now, Kurdish-held areas are separated from the regime-held areas by a large 
strip of land controlled by IS and others. The Syrian regime has correctly calculated that a 
Kurdish presence on the Turkish border would complicate Turkey’s efforts against forces 
loyal to President Assad.
The Turkish government initially assumed that it did need to accept Rojava because the 
Syrian civil would end within a couple of months with the toppling of Assad. In his place, 
friendly forces would keep Kurds under control. But this did not turn out to be the case.
Turkey was alarmed by Kurdish attempts to gain foothold in Syria. In 2012, then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey would not allow a terrorist entity on its borders, which 
was not a reference to Al Nusra Front or other similar organisations, but to the Kurds. 
Erdoğan described the establishment of a Kurdish entity as Turkey’s red line. The PKK’s 
then executive leader Murat Karayılan threatened to spread the war across Turkey if there 
was a Turkish intervention in Syria. The conflict between Turkey and the PKK reached 
its peak in 2012, with the PKK taking more risks in military terms for the sake of Rojava 
then they took for developments in Turkey. Turkey’s red line and policy of denial towards 
Rojava hasn’t changed since then.
Fortunately, the intense fighting in 2012 was enough to persuade people on both sides 
that there would be no military solution to the Kurdish question given the capabilities of 
both sides. So Turkey and the PKK entered into another round of peace talks, allowing the 
PKK to concentrate its efforts in Syria, forming and joining the armed units of the Kurdish 
forces in Syria.
Peace talks in Turkey ensured a de facto mutual ceasefire within Turkish borders. But for 
the PKK, the fighting never ceased. PKK-linked Kurds in Syria first had to face attacks 
from Free Syrian Army groups, then from al Nusra Front, and later IS. During this period, 
Kurds frequently accused Turkey of supporting Islamist groups against the Kurds.
It was a plausible prediction at that time that the Islamist onslaught against PKK-linked 
Kurds in Syria would weaken the Kurds and provide better conditions for Turkey in its 
negotiations with the PKK. This was not however the case. Attacks by al Nusra and later 
by IS made the Kurds more powerful and provided them with legitimacy in the eyes of 
western governments.
This legitimisation started in Sinjar. When hundreds of thousands of Yazidis came under 
attack by IS, the PKK and their Syrian allies the YPG played a significant role in fighting 
them back. This was probably the first open contact between the PKK and the US military. 
The process of Kurdish aligning with the West peaked when the US first airdropped weap-
ons in Kobanî. The YPG went on to take more areas from the Islamic State than any other 
force in Iraq or Syria.
Moreover, the Turkish government’s failure to embrace the Kurds in Syria and to adopt a 
harsh rhetoric against the Rojava Kurds resulted in the ruling AKP losing Kurdish votes, 
and caused riots like those of 6-8 October 2014. These had the effect of breaking the trust 
built on the side of the Turkish government towards the PKK.
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Despite these setbacks, some inside the AKP, along with Turkish intelligence and the PKK 
leader Öcalan, attempted to continue the peace process, with the Dolmabahçe Accord, 
where senior government officials and pro-Kurdish left wing HDP MPs read a public state-
ment by Öcalan, and the joint operation between the Turkish army and the YPG to move 
the tomb of Ottoman leader Suleiman Shah in northern Syria.
However, the pro-peace figures on both sides ultimately failed to bring about a solution, 
and the rise of violence in Turkey’s Kurdish areas severly curbed Turkey’s ambitions in the 
Middle East.
The AKP failed to take advantage of the opportunity they had between 2013 and early 
2015, during the PKK talks, to adopt a positive policy towards Rojava. Turkey geared 
its Syrian policy towards preventing Kurdish or PKK gains. While western governments 
invested in Turkey to further their causes in Syria, Turkey invested most of its efforts in 
making the Kurds lose. Its top priority was first to prevent a Kurdish entity, then to remove 
the Assad regime and finally to oppose IS. Turkey’s inability to accept Rojava came to 
determine its whole Syria policy and made it fail to align with the western position.
Turkey is still aiming at giving KDP linked Kurds control over some parts of Syria to bal-
ance those linked with the PKK. This project failed several times, most recently when the 
KDP-linked Syrian Kurds failed to gather support for Kurdish rights at the opposition 
conference in Riyadh. 
The KDP and Barzani himself are also facing significant political problems in their own 
right – there should be concerns that the KDP may not necessarily be a good partner in the 
fight against the PKK or IS.
Some suggest that because Turkey had been very hostile towards Iraqi Kurds in the past 
but then managed to change its policies, the same thing could happen with Syrian Kurds. 
However, Turkey established better relations with Iraqi Kurds long before they established 
their semi-state precisely because of the PKK, because rivalry between Iraqi Kurds and the 
PKK gave the Iraqi Kurds some common ground with Turkey. These dynamics indicate the 
unlikelihood of a rapprochement happening in the Syrian case.
Over the last couple of years, the developments in Syrian Kurdish areas were linked to the 
developments in Ankara more than the developments in Damascus, Washington, Tehran, 
Moscow or Raqqa. The question is now whether this will continue – or whether Kurds will find 
themselves in a new world where their policies are not necessarily centred around Ankara. In 
order for Ankara to remain relevant, not only does it need to have an implementable policy 
in Rojava, and towards other individual Kurdish political forces, but the Turkish government 
needs to have a broader Kurdish policy that goes beyond dealings with individual actors. 
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The Kurdish policy of Turkey’s ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has 
become as controversial as its Middle East policies. Both policies are intertwined, so the 
task of untangling them and providing a meaningful analysis is challenging.
The controversy surrounding the AKP’s Kurdish and Middle East policies centres around 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s current president and the first to be elected by popular 
vote, following a long premiership that lasted over a decade.
When compared to his predecessors, Erdoğan did far more to address Kurdish grievances 
than any other Turkish leader. He not only acknowledged the Kurdish question in 2005 
but, in a speech in Turkey’s Kurdish stronghold city of Diyarbakır, he was the first prime 
minister to ever mention that the ‘state did commit wrongdoings’ and to apologise on 
its behalf to Kurdish citizens. He took a big risk by launching secret negotiations in the 
early 2000s, which led to the announcement at the end of 2012 of a ‘peace process’ that 
was to be started with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) leader Abdullah 
Öcalan, who had been serving a life sentence. This was a big leap, as Öcalan had previously 
been demonised in the official rhetoric as a ‘terrorist’, a ‘murderer of children’ and ‘public 
enemy number one’. Suddenly, Öcalan was transformed into a ‘partner’ in the resolution 
of Turkey’s decades-long and seemingly intractable Kurdish question. He was transformed 
from being a part of the problem to being a part of the solution, and moreover, a key char-
acter in the solution. 
It was Erdoğan who hosted the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’s president Mas-
soud Barzani in party congresses along with other foreign dignitaries and allowed him to 
speak in Kurdish when addressing the delegates of the AKP in a live-televised event. Bar-
zani was also greeted in Diyarbakır with Kurdish flags besides Turkish ones. The Kurdish 
leader was able to address the Kurds in the heart of Turkey’s overwhelmingly Kurdish 
southeast in his native language in an open-air meeting. These moves were unprecedented, 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could be considered the most audacious Turkish leader in rela-
tion to the Kurdish issue.
Yet, for many Kurds, particularly those of Turkey and Syria, he remains the villain who 
suppressed them – a suppression that is sometimes compared with the brutal overthrow 
of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka by the central government just at a time when hopes 
were highest for a political settlement. Such diametrically opposed and irreconcilable opin-
ions of Erdoğan remain to this day. 
The truth necessitates a closer scrutiny of the AKP’s Kurdish policy within the framework 
of its Middle East policy, especially regarding its domestic political imperatives and ideo-
logical underpinnings. The AKP’s foreign policy has to be assessed in its two very different 
phases, which are also relevant in terms of its domestic policy.
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The first phase runs between 2002 and 2011, and the second from 2011 to the present day. 
The year 2002 saw the AKP winning the elections with a safe majority, marking the end of 
Turkey’s experience of coalition governments, a period that was considered a ‘lost decade’ 
as far as concerned the Kurdish issue. The AKP won 34 per cent of the votes but found itself 
in a very hostile environment, surrounded by the old Kemalist elite who were extremely 
opposed to any semblance of Islamism in the political realm, as well as an uneasy military 
with a tradition of interference in politics waiting in the wings.
The first AKP government was formed by Abdullah Gül in November 2002, as the political 
ban on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan prevented him from becoming a member of parliament. 
Following the lifting of the ban, Erdoğan became prime minister in March 2003, when he 
set out on a vigorous course of democratic reforms, aiming for the European Union (EU) 
membership.
Carrying the banner of integration into the EU was unusual for an allegedly Islamist party; 
nonetheless, its market-friendly economic policies and reformist attitude gave it the nec-
essary political legitimisation and support from Turkey’s western allies, even though they 
also insulated it from the secularist establishment of the Turkish state. Simultaneously, 
the US invasion of Iraq created friction and resentment towards the Turkish military, as 
the latter was concerned about regime change there, fearing it would allow Kurds to gain 
further political legitimacy, which in the military’s eyes would ultimately affect Turkey. 
Friction with Washington weakened the military’s stance, and this in turn benefited the 
AKP’s domestic and foreign policy.
Turkey was eventually able to start accession negotiations at the EU’s December 2004 
Summit in Brussels. This coincided with Erdoğan’s apology for the ‘state’s wrongdoings’ 
in Diyarbakır, which could be seen as the natural outcome of the AKP’s bold initiatives for 
democratic reform and its attempts to comply with EU criteria.
It is also surprising to note that secret contact with Kurdish insurgents was underway since 
2006, and accelerated in 2007, culminating in the publicly declared ‘Kurdish opening’ of 
the government. The AKP’s moves to tackle the Kurdish question needed the assistance of 
the KRG (Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government) authorities ruling the northern territo-
ries of Iraq, and these contacts were mostly and covertly conducted by Turkey’s National 
Intelligence Organisation (MİT).
Relations with Iraqi Kurds led to diplomatic representation of Turkey in Erbil and further 
development of economic and political ties with the KRG government, particularly with its 
president Massoud Barzani and its prime minister Nechirvan Barzani.
These warmer relations with the KRG provided the only missing link in Turkey’s Middle 
East policy, described by the motto ‘zero problems with neighbours’ – a characterisation 
coined by the architect of the AKP’s foreign policy and current Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu.
The ‘zero problems with neighbours’ ideal was meant to be ‘pro-status quo’, in contrast 
to Iran’s perceived ‘revisionism’. As a matter of fact, it helped Turkey’s re-entry into the 
region through the application of ‘soft power’ via commerce, diplomacy, and politics. ‘The 
Kurdish opening’ announced in August 2009 fit well into this idea. However, by the end of 
2009, the term was changed to ‘Democratic Opening’, and shortly afterwards was changed 
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once again to the ‘National Unity and Brotherhood Project’, a term emptied of all mean-
ing. Notwithstanding these frequent changes, the process itself generated hope for further 
reforms with regards to the Kurdish issue and created an atmosphere of an enduring cease-
fire. Not only did it bring a cherished normalcy to the lives of Kurdish citizens of Turkey 
but it also provided the AKP with a stable environment under which it could pursue its 
reformist economic policies.
This first phase of AKP rule ended in 2011, with the Arab Spring and the beginning of the 
Syrian conflict. Since 2011, a very different AKP foreign policy and Kurdish policy slowly 
began to emerge. The Arab Spring signified the end of the status quo in the MENA region, 
rendering the ‘zero problems with the neighbours’ policy irrelevant. When the Muslim 
Brotherhood moved to power in some countries, the AKP saw this as a historical opportu-
nity to project Turkey as a pivotal regional power. With its Islamist identity, Turkey’s ruling 
party felt on the same page with these new rulers of primarily Sunni Arab states.
When protests reached Syria, the AKP took the initiative to form the Syrian opposition with 
the Muslim Brotherhood as its backbone. Thus, by actively advocating regime change in 
a neighbouring country, it departed from republican Turkey’s traditional foreign policy.
This prudent foreign policy that had marked decades of republican Turkey was increas-
ingly underpinned by pro-Sunni Islamism. The AKP steered the state towards forming an 
axis with Qatar and providing support to Salafi–jihadi opposition groups in Syria fighting 
against an Alawite regime that historically enjoyed the backing of Iran, of Hezbollah – its 
Shiʿa arm in Lebanon, of the Shiʿa-dominated Iraqi government, and of Russia.
The ambitious seeking of a regime change in Syria marks a ‘revisionist’ Turkey under 
Erdoğan and the AKP. The pro-sectarian, Sunni-oriented Syrian policy of an AKP-led 
Turkey found its Sunni proxies within the wide spectrum of the Syrian opposition – and 
included among these were Salafi–jihadi groups. Within a larger framework, the posture 
of Erdoğan and the AKP converged with the Islamic State, which claimed to have erased 
the Sykes-Picot boundaries of Iraq and Syria drawn by western, ‘crusader’ powers. The 
so-called Islamic State presented itself as a useful instrument for Ankara in its anti-Kurdish 
drive, especially with the emergence of Kurdish self-rule all along Turkey’s border with 
Syria. Unlike the Kurdish entity in Iraq, the one in Syria was under the control of a PKK-af-
filiate. A continuous Kurdish zone stretching from the eastern intersection of Turkey’s 
borders with Iraqi Kurdistan all the way west, towards the Mediterranean and adjacent to 
Turkey, became, in the eyes of the Turkish state, an existential challenge.
The ‘Rojava Revolution’ – so-called by PKK supporters since July 2012 – made clear to 
Ankara the increasing magnitude of its own Kurdish insurgency. ‘Rojava’ provided a stra-
tegic depth to Turkey’s Kurdish struggle against Ankara, and, by presenting the Kurds as 
the only consistent fighting force against the Islamic State, elevated them to the status of 
natural and trusted allies of Western countries. ‘Rojava’ and the increased role of the PKK 
and its affiliates have become major concerns for Erdoğan.
Despite the fact that Erdoğan did more to address Kurdish grievances than any of his 
predecessors, the suspicion lingered that his efforts were instrumental in nature, designed 
more than anything else to serve his political ambitions. Actually dealing with core Kurdish 
demands had never been Erdoğan’s priority – that was not part of his political make-up.
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When the usefulness of the peace process had passed, as the elections cycle that started in 
March 2014 came to its end in November 2015, peace negotiations, as instrumental as they 
had been for Erdoğan, were terminated by him.
Even with new dynamics in the region, the peace process would now be very difficult to 
resume. Russia’s strategic military move in Syria that began in September 2015 could be 
seen as a game changer. With such a new dynamic to the Syrian equation, the PKK and 
its affiliates had the opportunity to ride on a formidable Moscow–Tehran axis, feeling 
emboldened and acting with much more resilience vis-à-vis Erdoğan’s policies. Further-
more, the downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey on 24 November 2015 deteriorated 
Turkish-Russian relations, and the worsening relations between Kurds and the Turkish 
state would be further exacerbated by stronger Russian support. Despite Erdoğan’s tactical 
flexibility, all these aspects posed significant challenges for him.
Moreover, ever since the collapse of the peace process in summer 2015, the new generation 
of Kurdish militants entrenched in the cities and towns of Turkey’s Kurdish southeastern 
region posed a qualitatively different challenge to the Turkish state than the PKK did in 
the rural areas of that same region 20 years ago.
Erdoğan and his AKP are ill-equipped to overcome the much more complex challenges of 
present times. The Kurdish challenge promises to reveal more about the shortcomings of 
Erdoğan’s Kurdish and regional policies, and even to confirm its ultimate defeat.
The resolution of the Kurdish conflict, or a peace process under Erdoğan and the AKP 
government, is as remote as ever. Unless a radical shift takes place, there is little hope for 
the resolution of the Kurdish question in the near future.
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AFAD Disaster and Emergency Authority Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
AKP Justice and Development Party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
ANAP Motherland Party Anavatan Partisi
AP Justice Party Adalet Partisi
BDP Peace and Democracy Party Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi
CHP Republican People’s Party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
DP Democrat Party Demokrat Parti
DYP True Path Party Doğru Yol Partisi
EU European Union  
HDP Peoples’ Democratic Party Halkın Demokrasi Partisi
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government 
IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation İnsani Yardım Vakfı
IS Islamic State  
KCK Group of Communities in Kurdistan Koma Civakên Kurdistan
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party 
KDPS Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria
KNC Kurdish National Council 
KTCC Kurdistan Training Coordination Center
MERI Middle East Research Institute
MİT National Intelligence Organisation Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PYD Democratic Union Party Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat
YPG People’s Protection Units Yekîneyên Parastina Gel
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